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INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AND HABITAT PROTECTION: THE
MARTINEZ DECISION SUPPLIES A RESOUNDING JUDICIAL REAFFIRMATION
Michael C. Blumm*
Jane G. Steadman**
Abstract: In the mid-nineteenth century, as the pace of American westward
expansion accelerated and tension between white settlers and indigenous tribes
mounted, the federal government convinced many Pacific Northwest tribes to
enter into treaties that would facilitate white settlement. In exchange for cession
of millions of acres of their homeland, the tribes retained the right of taking fish at
all usual and accustomed places in common with white settlers. In the 1905 case
United States v. Winans, the United States Supreme Court explained that the
treaty fishing right constitutes a “servitude upon every piece of land.” We have
described this servitude as a “piscary profit,” a familiar property right at common
law that must be exercised free from unreasonable interference. While the
universally shared assumption at the time the treaties were signed was that the
salmon resource was inexhaustible, in fact the salmon have been in precipitous
decline since the late-1800s. This scarcity bred conflicts, which have forced the
tribes to enforce their treaty fishing right in the courts for over a century. This
article explores the history and contours of the treaty fishing right from 1905 to
present, tracing the evolution of the federal courts’ understanding that implied
within the fishing right is a right of access, a right to a fair share of the salmon
harvest, and a right of habitat protection. In particular, the article examines the
2007 Culverts Case, in which Judge Ricardo S. Martinez resoundingly affirmed
that the treaty fishing right prohibits habitat-damaging activities that preclude
tribes from earning a moderate living through fishing—in this case, the state of
Washington’s construction and maintenance of fish passage-blocking culverts.
The article concludes that not only is Judge Martinez’s decision the logical
progeny of over a century’s worth of precedent, the result is consistent with
common law principles of profits. In the end, the Martinez Decision represents
the most important treaty fishing rights decision in decades, with the potential to
rectify a fundamental unfairness in treaty fishing rights law, which previously
provided access to fisheries, allocated harvest shares, and yet allowed destruction
of the salmon resource, the central consideration of one of the largest real estate
transactions in history.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1850s, in order to facilitate white settlement of the Pacific Northwest,1 the federal
government’s negotiators drafted and convinced numerous indigenous tribes to sign treaties
ceding vast quantities of tribal lands, while assuring the tribes they would retain “the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed [places] in common with [white settlers].”2 The tribes

1

See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 56–63 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE
SALMON] (indicating Congress passed 1850 statute authorizing treaty negotiations with the
Northwest Tribes in response to white settlement of Oregon Territory); Kent Richards, The
Stevens Treaties of 1854–1855: An Introduction, 106 OR. HIST. Q. paras. 8–11 (2005), available
at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ohq/106.3/richards.html (describing factors
leading to need for treaties).
2
See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creak, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually, Puyallup,
Steilacoom, Squawskin, S'Homamish, Stehchass, T'Peeksin, Squi-aitl, and Sa-heh-wamish , art.
3, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133. There were ten treaties with similar language. See Jack Landau, Empty
Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 417 n. 26
(1980) (providing citations to treaties).
In the treaties, the tribes ceded Indian title to the government. Indian (or aboriginal) title
was a possessory right to historic territories, but it did not include the right to alienate to anyone
other than the U.S. government. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823)
-2-
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signing the treaties were, as one federal district judge determined, singularly dependent on
salmon for their subsistence, economy, and culture.3 The government’s chief negotiator, Isaac
Ingalls Stevens, explicitly proclaimed to the natives at one treaty signing that, “[t]his paper [the
treaty] secures your fish.”4 The tribes5 that signed the treaties relied on assurances like this in

(denying rights of “chiefs” to convey clear title to land speculators) (“[Upon discovery, Indians]
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”). One of us has described
Indian title as the equivalent of a fee simple subject to a federal right of preemption. See
Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine, Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and
Their Significance to Treaty-Making in the United States, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 741 (2004).
3
United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F.Supp. 312, 406 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979). Due to the primacy of fish harvests to tribal culture, religion,
diet, and economy, the treaty negotiators understood that protection of historic fishing rights was
a precondition to the signing of any treaties. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 62;
Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered
Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (1991) (describing significance of salmon to Indian
tribes and circumstances of treaty negotiations); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND
NISQUALLY INDIANS xxvi (“Fishing is more than a right, more than a way to make a living. It is
a way of life—a part of life itself, an integral part of the whole artistic, religious, economic, and
social life of the Northwest Coast Indians.”).
4
See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DIV. OF FORESTRY &
GRAZING, REPORT ON SOURCE, NATURE, AND EXTENT OF THE FISHING, HUNTING AND
MISCELLANEOUS RELATED RIGHTS OF CERTAIN INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON AND OREGON 35
(July 1942). Stevens was not only the government’s treaty negotiator, but also the governor of
the Washington territory, the territory’s superintendent of Indian affairs, and a surveyor of a
potential transcontinental railroad. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 57. Stevens
was “a young and ambitious politician . . . determined to facilitate rapid white settlement. Id. at
59.
5
Governor Stevens and his assistant, lawyer and ethnologist George Gibbs, organized
bands of Indians into tribes for the purpose of negotiating the treaties, arbitrarily assigning some
bands a subordinate or dominate role in the tribes they organized. They appointed friendly chiefs
on the basis of whether they could speak Chinook jargon, a 300-word trade language that was the
language of the treaty negotiations. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 60. To this day,
the tribes regard the beginning of their political identity as the date of the treaty signings. Id. at
-3-
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ceding some 64 million acres of land—one of the largest peaceful real estate transfers in the
history of the world; the tribes retained only small reservations as homelands.6 There was no
need for large reservations, the government negotiators confidently informed the tribes, because
the off-reservation fishing right would provide the tribes with the means to a livelihood at
minimal cost to the government.7
When the treaties were signed, the universally shared assumption was that the salmon
resource was inexhaustible.8 But even before the end of the 19th century, Northwest salmon runs
were in precipitous decline, due to new harvest technologies (mostly employed by non-Indians),

62.
6

Id. at 57 (noting the tribes ceded 64 million acres in nine treaties, retaining less than six
million acres). In addition to retention of the right to fish at places and small reservations of
land, the tribes received $1.2 million in exchange for the 64 million acres. Id. See also Miller,
supra note 3, at 552–55 (relating circumstances under which treaties were negotiated).
7
The federal government aimed to keep expenditures for the tribes at a minimum by
allowing the tribes to maintain economic self-sufficiency through fishing. SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 5; United States v. Washington (Martinez Decision), No. CV
9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166, at * 10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007) (quoting historian Richard
White to the effect that “[w]hat Stevens and his negotiators explicitly promised in response to
Indian objections was access to the usual places for procuring food and continued economic
exchange with the whites. . . . By guaranteeing the Indians a right to their share of the bounty of
the land, rivers, and Sound, the treaties would enable them to feed themselves at little cost to the
government.”).
8
See Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *11 (quoting historian Joseph E. Taylor,
“Indians had no reason to believe during the period of treaty negotiation that white settlers would
interfere, either directly through their own harvest or indirectly through their environmental
impacts, with Indian fisheries in the future. During treaty negotiations, Indians, like whites,
assumed that their cherished fisheries would remain robust forever.”); Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n (Passenger Fishing Vessel), 443
U.S. 658, 669, 675–76 (1979), aff’g United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F.Supp.
312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (“In sum, it is fair to conclude that when the treaties were negotiated,
neither party realized or intended that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, a
resource that had always been thought inexhaustible would be allocated . . . when it later became
scarce.”).
-4-
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increased white population, and the demands of distant markets.9 This scarcity bred conflicts,
and the treaty promise of the “right of taking fish” became the subject of numerous court
opinions, including no fewer than seven U.S. Supreme Court opinions between 1905 and 1979.10
In the last of these decisions, the Court affirmed District Judge George Boldt’s historic

9

Prior to the influx of white settlers from the east, “as many as 30 million wild salmon
and [steelhead] may have returned to the rivers and streams of Washington annually.” PAUL
WAGNER & PAUL SEKKULICH, FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON
LEGISLATURE 6 (1997) [FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Columbia River likely
supported 16 million salmon. Id. By the late nineteenth century, more efficient and devastating
harvest technologies like fish wheels, drift nets, and weirs fed ravenous cannery operations that
sprung up along the Columbia River. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 5–6. These new
techniques as well as increased demand for canned salmon from the local white population and
newly accessible eastern markets (primarily opened through new railroads) led to decimation of
the salmon runs before the turn of the century. Id. In 1883, for example, the lower Columbia
River harvest produced 43 million pounds of chinook, while just seven years later the amount
was half that. Id. See also Manuel Nikel-Zueger, Saving Salmon the American Indian Way,
PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. POL’Y SERIES, Nov. 2003, at 12–13 (describing how canning expanded
market for salmon).
More recently, dams, timber harvests, grazing, industrial pollution, and hatcheries, among
other activities, diminished the already struggling salmon runs. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm &
Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific
Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 409 n. 5 (1998) [hereinafter
Piscary Profit] (estimating annual Columbia Basin salmon runs at 10 to 16 million adult fish
historically and below 1 million in 1994).
10
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (treaty right guarantees tribes access
across private property to reach their historic fisheries); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S.
149 (1918) (tribal access right burdens lands that a tribe did not expressly cede in its treaty, but
which its members used historically); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (state cannot
burden the treaty fishing right by requiring tribal fishers to purchase state licenses); Dep’t of
Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (state can regulate tribal harvests in
the interest of conservation if nondiscriminatory); Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup
II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (state ban of net fishing in favor of hook-and-line fishing was not a
nondiscriminatory regulation due to its effects on tribal fishing); Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (upholding negotiated allocation of harvests between
tribal and nontribal fishers, even after a lower court decision determined that the tribe’s
reservation still existed); Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (treaty fishing right includes a
right to harvest up to one-half the available harvest, subject to conservation needs). For
discussion of these cases, see generally SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at ch. 3
(describing Indian treaty fishing rights cases in detail); Piscary Profit, supra note 9 (same).
-5-
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determination that the “in common with” language in the treaties guaranteed tribal fishers more
than an equal opportunity to fish alongside white fishers; instead, it assured them up to half of
the harvest.11
In the “Boldt Decision”—as it came to be called—originally filed in 1970, the tribes not
only asked the court to declare that the treaties entitled them to a share of the salmon harvest,
they also maintained that 1) their harvest share should include hatchery fish, and 2) their “right
of taking fish” included the right to salmon habitat protection.12 Judge Boldt deferred these two
issues while he considered the allocation issue, and subsequently retired.13 Ensuing judges had
little difficulty resolving the hatchery fish issue in the tribes’ favor,14 but the habitat issue
remained unresolved for some thirty-seven years. Although a federal district judge, Judge
William Orrick, concluded in 1980 that the treaties included a habitat protection right,15 an en
banc Ninth Circuit ultimately decided five years later that it was unwise to resolve the habitat
issue in the absence of a concrete factual controversy.16 For over two decades after that decision,
the issue simmered, as the tribes looked for a suitable concrete factual controversy that did not
implicate the federal government, whose support the tribes wanted in the litigation.17

11

Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 682, 686–87.
United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F.Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979).
13
On Judge Boldt, see infra note 74.
14
United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F.Supp. 187, 200–02 (W.D. Wash.
1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
15
Orrick Decision, 506 F.Supp. at 203–04, 208.
16
U.S. v. Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357 (worrying that articulating legal rules in the
absence of concrete facts would produce results that would be “imprecise in definition and
uncertain in dimension”).
17
The litigation was, after all, a continuation of the case filed in 1970 in which the lead
plaintiff was the federal government. The state tried unsuccessfully to seek injunctive and
12

-6-
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In 2001, the tribes, along with the federal government, finally initiated action against the
state of Washington, alleging that the state’s construction and maintenance of highway and
railroad culverts that block salmon migration violated the treaty fishing right.18

After an

unsuccessful attempt to settle the case,19 federal District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez ruled that the
treaties in fact forbid the state from constructing and maintaining highway culverts that block
salmon migration, which, in turn, impermissibly reduces the number of salmon available for
harvest.20 This short and uncomplicated 2007 decision is certainly the most important treaty
fishing right decision since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Judge Boldt nearly thirty years
ago,21 for it suggests that the treaties, under the “common-sense” proposition that Judge Orrick
recognized so long ago22—and with which several Ninth Circuit judges agreed23—protect the

declaratory relief against the federal government. Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *1
(denying state’s counterclaims on basis of sovereign immunity doctrine).
18
Technically, the tribes initiated a sub-proceeding under the continuing jurisdiction of
the original United States v. Washington case, which began in 1970. Id.
19
See id. (indicating parties were unable to reach an agreement after six years of
settlement discussions).
20
Id. at 12. Judge Martinez, a Seattle native and University of Washington graduate, was
nominated to the federal district court for the Western District of Washington by President
George W. Bush in 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in 2004. Wash. State Bar Ass’n,
Interview with the Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez, http://www.wsba.org/martinez.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2009).
21
Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), discussed in Piscary Profit, supra note
9, at 455–59.
22
Orrick Decision, 506 F.Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (“The most fundamental
prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken. . . .
[E]nvironmentally-acceptable habitat is essential to the survival of the fish, without which the
expressly-reserved right to take fish would be meaningless and valueless. Thus, it is necessary to
recognize an implied environmental right in order to fulfill the purposes of the fishing clause.”).
23
See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 1368 (Norris, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also infra notes 123 and 129 and accompanying text.
-7-
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habitat on which the essential bargain of the treaties, the salmon, depends.24 The decision not
only promises to revolutionize culvert construction and maintenance in Washington, it may
equip the tribes with ability to obtain judicial scrutiny of a number of salmon habitat-damaging
activities, such as timber harvesting, grazing, and dam operations.
This article explains the treaty fishing right and its habitat protection dimension in light
of the Martinez Decision. Part I begins with a brief exploration of the history of treaty fishing
right litigation, beginning with the foundational case of United States v. Winans through the
Puyallup trilogy, the last of which the Supreme Court decided during the pendency of Judge
Boldt’s consideration of the tribes’ claim to a harvest share. Part II examines the Boldt Decision,
its affirmation by the Supreme Court, and the ensuing hatchery salmon decision. Part III
explains the journey that the habitat protection issue traveled through the courts during the late
20th century. Part IV considers the effects of road culverts on salmon and considers the value of
using culverts as the factual vehicle to crystallize the right to habitat protection. Part V, the heart
of the article, analyzes Judge Martinez’s decision and its implications. Part VI describes cases
preceding the Martinez Decision that foretold judicial affirmation of the right to habitat
protection. Part VII considers a couple of crucial issues that the Martinez Decision did not
resolve: the role of the federal government in habitat protection and the scope of the remedy that
the court should prescribe.

The article concludes that, if it survives appeal, the Martinez

Decision will be the most important treaty fishing rights decision since the Supreme Court’s

24

Shortly after Judge Martinez’s ruling, the parties entered settlement negotiations to
decide upon the remedy, but the negotiations have failed. Email from Fronda Woods, Associate
Attorney General, State of Washington Attorney General’s Office, to Jane Steadman, Law
Student, Lewis & Clark Law School (Oct. 9, 2008, 09:18 PST) (on file with authors).
Consequently, the parties are preparing for trial on the remedy issue. Id.
-8-
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affirmation of Judge Boldt. Given the federal government’s duplicitous and ineffectual approach
to salmon restoration,25 the decision could be a vehicle to make the 19th century treaty promises
considerably more important to salmon restoration prospects than the 20th century Endangered
Species Act listings.26
I.

TREATY FISHING RIGHTS FROM WINANS TO THE PUYALLUP TRILOGY: A
BRIEF HISTORY
From the start, it was clear that the mere signing of treaties reserving to the tribes the

“right of taking fish in common” with white settlers would provide little protection to tribal
members’ ability to actualize that right.27 Within thirty years of signing the Stevens treaties,
conflicts between settlers and tribal members over fishing rights became frequent and fierce.28
The natives came to understand that if they were to exercise their right to fish at all, they would

25

See generally Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson & Joshua D. Smith, Practiced At
the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered
Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006) [hereinafter Practiced at the Art of Deception].
26
See id. at 734–94.
27
Conflicts between landowner settlers and tribal fishers were commonplace throughout
the Columbia Basin in the years following the Civil War. For some of the details, see Michael
C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary...Than the Atmosphere They
Breathed:” Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court–A Centennial Remembrance of
United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT. RES. J. 489, 506–16 (2006)
[hereinafter Winans Centennial] (noting “violent friction ensued between Indians and the first
wave of settlers” upon announcement by Governor Stevens of the availability of lands ceded by
the Indians shortly after the treaties were signed). See also JOSEPH C. DUPRIS, KATHLEEN S. HILL
& WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., THE SI’LAILO WAY: INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE
COLUMBIA RIVER ch. 4 (2006) [hereinafter SI’LAILO WAY] (describing conflicts between Indians
and nonIndians over access to fisheries, including landowners’ use of “lockouts” to preclude
Indian access to fisheries and Indians’ resort to the self-help remedy of break-ins to gain access).
28
See, e.g., SI’LAILO WAY, supra note 27, at 59–60 (noting landowners’ use of
“lockouts” to preclude Indian access to fisheries and Indians’ resort to the self-help remedy of
break-ins to gain access); Miller, supra note 3, at 555 (indicating a “minor land rush” followed
Stevens’s opening of lands post-treaty signing, which led to a war between Indians and nonIndians); Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 504–05 (explaining that “violent friction ensued
between Indians and the first wave of settlers” upon announcement by Stevens of the availability
-9-
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need the help of the courts to enforce it.29 Litigation over the meaning of the treaty fishing right
began in 1884 and continues to present.30 Over the years, courts have identified a trinity of
rights implicit in the treaty fishing clause—a right of access, a right to a fair share of the harvest,
and a right to habitat protection.31 This section explores the chronology of cases explicating the
access right.
The first major legal battle involved the question of whether the treaty fishing right
included a right of access to historic fishing grounds.32 Each of the Stevens treaties reserved for
tribal members the right to take fish at “all usual and accustomed places,” which are historic
fishing grounds passed down from generation to generation among tribal members.33 However,
by the late nineteenth century, many homesteaders had begun fencing off land with river access
in an effort to exclude Indians from the land or from the fishery itself.34 The first significant

of lands ceded by the Indians).
29
Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 505, 524.
30
Id. at 506 n. 89.
31
O. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right As Part of the Trinity of
Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 281, 283
(2002–2003).
32
Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 506 n. 89 (2006) (indicating “[t]he first recorded
case involving treaty-fishing access” involved the “Tumwater” fishery, which was decided in
1884) (citation omitted).
33
SI’LAILO WAY, supra note 27, at 8–9 (describing inheritability of fishing sites); NikelZueger, supra note 9, at 5–7 (“Ownership of fishing sites meant more than merely the right to
fish in that place. Robert Higgs . . . explains that ‘what the Indians owned was not simply a
claim on certain quantities of fish. Rather, the Indians’ property rights ensured them the
opportunity to take the salmon normally returning—that is, returning without human
interception.’ Other people could not rob the fish by catching them before they arrived at
established fishing sites. . . . Families and individuals who had exclusive rights to certain fishing
sites had an incentive to invest time and resources to make the sites as productive as possible.”).
34
An early source of conflict arose from landowners precluding access to Indians’ usual
and accustomed fishing sites through such tactics as fencing, charging access fees, and
threatening physical violence. One account suggested the clashes between Indians and nonIndians over access to fishing grounds arose out of a fundamental conflict between the fishing
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decision was from the Washington Territorial Court in 1887, which, relying heavily on property
law principles, ruled that landowners could not preclude tribal members’ access to historic
fishing grounds.35 Nonetheless, landowners continued to exclude tribal fishers from Columbia

servitude established by the treaties and the unrestricted rights of the holder of land in fee simple
absolute established in federal land grants to white settlers. SI’LAILO WAY, supra note 27, at 58–
59. Recounting the settlers’ restriction of Indian fishing access, the historians wrote:
Thus, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Indian fishing
grounds on the Columbia were quickly enclosed by private nonIndian ownership.
Co-ownership became a myth. Indian access to usual and accustomed fishing
locations became a fictional and distorted thing. In hundreds of confrontations,
the Indians met land owners who hadn’t heard of the fishing ‘servitude’ or who
didn’t believe in it; who knew for sure that access was not here but over there;
who let the gates down for only a small and reasonable fee; who insisted the
fishery was a private one; who advised that discards or eels from the fish wheels
or fish-heads from the cannery were preferable fare to fish freshly caught. The
Indians encountered the fences and road closures and padlocks and abutments and
signs and guards and dogs and firearms that were among the law-sanctioned
‘pleasures’ of all fee-simple property owners. Thus, the ‘supreme law of the land’
[i.e., the treaty right to fish in common with white landowners] was thrashed
thoroughly by the common law of property possession.
Id. See also Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 436 (describing early conflicts).
35
The first case to challenge the fencing practice was United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333,
335 (Wash. Terr. 1887). On behalf of R.H. Milroy, a federal Indian agent, and the Yakama
Tribe, the United States filed suit against Frank Taylor, a farmer who had enclosed his land in
order to protect crops from trampling during the Indian’s yearly seasonal fishing encampment.
Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 517–19; Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 436. Historically,
Yakama tribal members used Taylor’s newly acquired land in order to get to and from the
Tumwater, the fishing grounds at Celilo Falls on the Columbia River. Taylor, 13 P. at 334.
They also fished from the shore, cured fish, erected temporary dwellings, and allowed their
ponies to graze on what became the Taylor homestead. Id. (indicating Taylor stipulated that his
homestead “extend[ed] to and border[ed] upon the Columbia river at the site of [the Tumwater]
fishery, and are the same lands over and upon which said Indians have heretofore been
accustomed to go and return from said fishery, and upon which they had landed and cured the
fish taken by them from said fishery, and where they have been accustomed, during the fishing
season, to make their temporary abode, and pasture their ponies”). The Yakama Nation’s treaty
with the United States, in conformity with the other Stevens treaties, reserved to the tribe the
“right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them.” Treaty with the Yakamas, June
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Basin sites, and in the mid-1890s, Indian agents convinced the government to file a test case
involving access to the most important Indian fishing ground, Celilo Falls,36 on the lower

9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 art. III. At the same time, Taylor’s patent from the federal government
contained no mention of the federal treaty right. Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 518–19;
Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 436.
On behalf of the tribe, the federal government argued that the Indians reserved the right
to fish in their usual manner at their usual and accustomed grounds, while Taylor maintained that
the right was a grant from the federal government ensuring only that the Indians had fishing
opportunities equal to those of the whites. Taylor, 13 P. at 334. In 1887, the Washington
Territorial Supreme Court held that Taylor and other settlers could not impinge on the access of
tribal fishermen to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Id. at 335. First, the Territorial
Court relied on the familiar canon of construction in Indian law that “a treaty . . . is to be
liberally construed in favor of the Indians; and that in so far as the language used will allow, that
construction be adopted which will best subserve the object which the Indians, at the time the
treaty was made, would have been most likely to have desired and understood.” Id. See also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518 (1832) (foundational case for interpretation of treaties
made between U.S. government and Indian tribes). The Taylor court sided with the tribe,
explaining that the language of the treaty suggested a reserved right because it concerned
“certain ancient fisheries which had for generations been used . . . [by members] who had certain
well-defined habits and methods connected with such use.” Taylor, 13 P. at 334. The court
indicated that a settler took a patent to federal land “subject to” any “easement or servitude
impressed upon it,” and that the treaty fishing right constituted such a servitude. Id. at 335. This
decision marked the first interpretation of the treaty fishing right language, and it employed
reasoning later adopted by the Supreme Court in a seminal case on Indian access to fisheries. See
Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 436–37 (indicating the Supreme Court relied on the same
language in United States v. Winans).
At core, United States v. Taylor was a property rights decision. One of us once wrote:
“The servitude imposed a duty on Taylor to manage his land in such a way as to preserve the
Indians access to their historic fisheries. . . . The Taylor court relied on property law
fundamentals to deny a farmer the right to exclude the tribes from access to the resource by
fencing his property. The same principles should mean a fee owner cannot deny access by
dewatering streams for irrigation purposes or polluting streams by pesticide and sediment
runoff.” Id. at 438. These basic property principles continue to shape the contours of the treaty
right to habitat protection, as discussed infra in Parts III and IV.
36
Celilo Falls was the heart of tribal fishing in the Pacific Northwest, representing not
just a renowned sustainable fishery but also an important trading place and sacred ground for the
First Salmon Ceremony, which welcomes the first salmon to return and encourages the rest of
the salmon to come back. See SI’LAILO WAY, supra note 27, at ch. 1. In March of 1957, the
Army Corps of Engineers closed the gates at Dalles Dam, allowing the falls to be inundated by
the mighty Columbia River. Id. at 18.
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Columbia.37 After issuing a preliminary injunction against white fencing, then sitting on the
issue for some seven years,38 the federal district court finally decided that their treaty rights
entitled the tribes only to equal treatment with whites.39 Since white fishers could be fenced out
by landowners, so could tribal fishers.40
Nearly a decade after the case was originally filed, the Supreme Court reversed in United
States v. Winans,41 a memorable, poetic, and enduring decision, rooted in first principles of
property law and treaty interpretation.42 Justice Joseph McKenna observed that the right to fish
at usual and accustomed grounds “was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the
exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”43 Recognizing that
the tribes had reserved this paramount right to fish,44 McKenna concluded the reserved “right of

37

On the role of Indian agents in Winans and its predecessor cases, see Winans
Centennial, supra note 27, at 511–18, 522–24. The test case involved the obstructionist
activities of Audubon and Linnaens Winans, The Winans brothers owned a large fish wheel at
Celilo Falls, aggressively excluding tribal access to the lucrative fishery through intimidation,
assaults, and destruction of temporary shelters. Id. at 524
38
See id. at 525–28 (describing Judge Hanford’s machinations, which including
dissolving his seven-year old injunction against fencing without explanation in 1903).
39
United States v. Winans, Memorandum Decision on the Merits, Feb. 23, 1903,
discussed in Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 528–29.
40
Id.
41
198 U.S. 371 (1905). For extensive discussion of the case, see Piscary Profit, supra
note 9, at 440–45; Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 532–36.
42
See generally Winans Centennial, supra note 27, at 536–44 (concluding that the
Winans legacy included construing treaty language as tribes would understand, laying the
foundation of the reserved rights doctrine, treating treaty rights as property rights, and rejecting
state arguments that the “equal footing” doctrine trumped treaty rights).
43
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
44
Id. (“[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them—a reservation of those not granted.”).
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taking fish” created “a servitude upon every piece of land as though described therein.”45
Further, this “right in the land” burdened not only the federal government that agreed to it, but
also its grantees like states and private landowners.46 In other words, the Court concluded that
the reserved treaty fishing right was a piscary profit à prendre—“the right to go on another’s
property and take and remove a natural resource.”47 This 1905 decision has been the foundation
of treaty fishing rights for over a century.
In the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court continued to protect the piscary profit from
physical and economic barriers to access. Just thirteen years after Winans, the treaty fishing
rights issue was back before the Court, which decided that the piscary profit applied to lands that
a tribe did not explicitly cede but which it had used historically.48 A generation later, in
Washington v. Tulee,49 the Court held that the state of Washington could not charge tribal fishers
license fees because the fees were not indispensable to conservation of the salmon resource.50
Another generation later, in the Puyallup trilogy of decisions that occupied the Court’s attention
for a decade, the Court began to confront and strike down discriminatory “conservation”
regulation of tribal harvests on the part of the Pacific Northwest states.51 The Supreme Court

45

Id.
Id. at 381–82 (indicating the servitude burdened both “the United States and its
grantees as well as against the State and its grantees”).
47
See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 445 n. 183–184 (describing common law of piscary
profits à prendre and various courts’ description of treaty fishing rights as such).
48
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918) (refusing to use technical legal
rules to disadvantage tribal fishers, where they would produce a result conflicting with the
intention of the parties to the treaties that tribes would continue to fish at their historic sites).
49
315 U.S. 681 (1942).
50
Id. at 685 (concluding that the state license fee had both regulatory and revenuegenerating purposes, and that the regulatory purpose could be achieved through less burdensome
alternatives).
51
By the mid-twentieth century, the states had imposed strict conservation regulations
46
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decided that 1) the state could regulate tribal harvests if in the interest of a neutral conservation
purpose;52 2) banning net fishing (which the Indians exclusively practiced on the river in
question) was not a neutral conservation measure, since it saddled all conservation costs on tribal
fishers;53 and 3) the tribes and the state could agree to an allocation of harvests that included both
tribal on- and off-reservation harvests.54
Thus, by 1973, when the Supreme Court handed down its final Puyallup decision, the
tribes had won significant judicial victories. The Supreme Court had ruled that the treaties
recognized that the tribes possessed an affirmative easement to access their traditional fishing
grounds regardless of land ownership,55 determined that this right burdened lands not expressly
granted in a treaty if the tribe historically used those lands,56 announced that the state could not

and harvest restrictions, reflective of the fact that the rivers were producing salmon populations
at a tiny fraction of their historic levels. Although the salmon runs were already severely
depleted, the salmon population plummeted after construction of the Dalles Dam, which
inundated forever the sacred Celilo Falls. See ROBERTA ULRICH, EMPTY NETS: INDIANS, DAMS,
AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER 116 (1999) (describing depleted fish runs and resulting regulation).
52
Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (ruling, in confusing fashion, that the treaty
fishing right “may, of course, not by qualified by the state,” but that “the manner of fishing, the
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the state
in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation . . . does not discriminate against the
Indians”). Professor Ralph Johnson perceptively warned that this decision gave the state more
discretion than it could use in a nondiscriminatory fashion. See Ralph W. Johnson, The States
Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 207, 232–35 (1972).
53
Puyallup II, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973) (“There is discrimination here because all Indian
net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing, entirely preempted by non-Indians, is
allowed.”).
54
Puyallup III, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (upholding the allocation, which state courts had
approved, even though between Puyallup II and Puyallup III, the Ninth Circuit held that the
fishing site in question was an on-reservation site, not–as the state courts had assumed–an offreservation right in Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974)). On the
Puyallup trilogy, see Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 449–53.
55
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
56
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198–99 (1918).
-15-

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223

charge fees for the exercise of the treaty fishing right,57 and decided that while the state could
regulate the exercise of the tribal right for fish conservation purposes,58 the state could not single
out the tribes for an unfair portion of that conservation burden.59 Although the final decision in
the Puyallup trilogy approved a negotiated settlement of harvest rights between the tribes and the
state,60 in the absence of an agreement, whether the treaties entitled the tribes to a harvest share
remained unclear. But already a case was underway that would resolve this question.
II.

THE BELLONI AND BOLDT DECISIONS: RECOGNIZING A MEANINGFUL
TRIBAL HARVEST SHARE
The manner in which most treaty rights claims appeared in court was as defenses to

criminal prosecutions by states enforcing alleged conservation regulations.61

But, in 1968,

fourteen members of the Yakama Nation broke this pattern by filing suit against the state of
Oregon’s fish agencies, claiming that the state’s conservation regulations interfered with their
treaty-protected “right of taking fish.”62 Judge Robert Belloni agreed, rejecting the state’s

57

Washington v. Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1942).
Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398.
59
Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48.
60
Puyallup III, 433 U.S. at 177.
61
See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942) (holding state of Washington
could not charge Yakama tribal member a fee for fishing); Makah Tribe v. Schoettler, 192 F.2d
224, 226 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding state failed to demonstrate conservation necessity); Maison v.
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, 314 F.2d 169, 173–74 (9th Cir. 1963)
(overturning a state ban designed to protect non-Indian fisheries); Johnson, supra note 52, at
209–10. Some Indians and historians have charged that the states imposed and enforced harvest
regulations much more strictly against Indians than whites. See, e.g., ULRICH, supra note 51, at
118–22 (describing stringent regulation of Indian harvest and arrests). See also Piscary Profit,
supra note 9, at 435 n. 135, 453 n. 218 (describing series of decisions in which the Washington
state courts upheld earlier regulations limiting tribal harvests).
62
See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899, 903 (D. Or. 1969). Under the influence of
Assistant Regional Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, George Dysart, the federal
government, on behalf of itself and several tribes, filed a separate suit, captioned United States v.
Oregon, which was consolidated with the tribal suit for trial. See id. at 904; Charles F.
58
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presumption that it need not give separate recognition or protection to the treaty right in its
conservation regulations, and that those regulations could restrict treaty fishing so long as they
did not did not discriminate against tribal fishers.63

The state’s equal protection argument, he

stated, “would not seem unreasonable if all history, anthropology, biology, prior case law, and
the intention of the parties were to be disregarded.”64
Instead, Judge Belloni ruled that the treaty fishing right ensured to tribal fishers a right to
a “fair share” of the fish harvest,65 and he ordered the state to recognize the federal rights of the
tribes as a fishery distinct from the non-Indian fishery66 and to protect treaty fishing as a

Wilkinson, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 204–
05 (1992). Today, forty years later, the federal district court of Oregon retains jurisdiction over
U.S. v. Oregon, one of the longest running federal cases in history. See, e.g., United States v.
Oregon, No. 68-513-KI, 2008 WL 1711525, at *1 (D. Or. April 8, 2008) (representing most
recent case under continuing jurisdiction); Fronda Woods, Who’s in Charge of Fishing?, 106 OR.
HIST. Q. para. 52 (2005).
63
See Sohappy, 302 F.Supp. at 907 (“There is no support . . [in the case law] for any
such narrow interpretation of the state’s authority to distinguish between the regulation of Indian
treaty-protected fishing and that of fishing by others.”).
64
Id. at 905.
65
Id. at 907 (“I interpret [Puyallup I] to mean that the state cannot so manage the fishery
that little or no harvestable portion of the run remains to reach the upper portions of the stream
where the historic Indian places are mostly located.”). Notwithstanding his articulation of the
“fair share” principle, Judge Belloni did not define what an equitable allocation might be. This
question would be answered by a different judge in a ground-breaking opinion that would
become one of the most contentious in Pacific Northwest history. See infra notes 87–92 and
accompanying text (describing strife between Indian and non-Indian fisherman in the wake of
the Boldt Decision).
66
Id. at 912. See also id. at 910–11 (“Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and
commercial fishermen and seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two. But
the state seems to have ignored the rights of Indians who acquired a treaty right to fish at their
historic off-reservation fishing stations. If Oregon intends to maintain a separate status of
commercial and sports fisheries, it is obvious a third must be added, the Indian fishery.”). In
addition, Judge Belloni held that when the state undertook to regulate the treaty-protected “right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places,” it did not have “the same latitude in
prescribing the management objectives and the regulatory means of achieving them” as when
regulating a non-Indian fishery. Id. at 908. Instead, the state could use its regulatory authority
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“regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs for other users.”67 Later, he
established standards for the state to follow in achieving the “co-equal” status of the tribal
fishery, including requiring “meaningful” tribal participation in the development of harvest
regulations and ensuring that the regulations were “the least restrictive regulations” consistent
with ensuring conservation of the salmon.68 The Belloni Decision, as the case came to be called,
revolutionized salmon management in the Columbia Basin, eventually resulting in a negotiated
comprehensive management plan, which the court oversaw.69
The year after the Belloni Decision,70 as tribal members continued to be arrested,

“only to the extent necessary to prevent the exercise of [the treaty fishing] right in a manner that
will imperil the continued existence of the fish resource.” Id. Judge Belloni’s articulation of the
state agencies’ authority is characteristic of the lack of judicial deference to agency authority in
cases alleging treaty rights violations.
67
Id. at 911.
68
Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409, slip op. at 2–3 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 1969) (unpublished
judgment). See Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of Salmon in the
Columbia Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 677, 680–81 (1997) (reprinting a portion of Judge Belloni’s
unpublished judgment).
69
See Penny H. Harrison, The Evolution of a New Comprehensive Plan for Managing
Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16 ENVTL. L. 705 (1986); Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 454
(discussing manner in which Belloni Decision changed salmon management). In an interview
with an oral historian from the Oregon Historical Society, Judge Belloni described his decision
to retain continuing jurisdiction over the case and the twelve-year span in which he supervised
allocation decisions on the Columbia River. Oral History of Judge Robert Belloni by James
Strassmaier, Oral Historian, Oregon Historical Society (May 31, 1989) [hereinafter Belloni Oral
History]. Judge Belloni noted, “I . . . required the parties to get together and come up with a plan
to which they could all agree. . . . [A]fter I decided the case I realized that it wouldn’t operate by
itself. Someone in authority had to see that it was enforced, implemented, changed, if need be so
I took continuing jurisdiction of the case. The case didn’t end with my ruling. Whenever
disputes arose under the system, they’d come to me after filing the proper papers and have it
decided. I operated in that capacity for twelve years, I was more or less fishmaster of the
Columbia River for that length of time.”).
70
Initially, Oregon did not appeal the Belloni Decision, but when the judge adopted the
equal sharing formula from the Boldt Decision for the spring chinook run, the state eventually
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed. Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
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especially in Washington,71 the federal government and numerous tribes in western Washington
filed suit in federal court in Washington, asking for an allocated share of Puget Sound Basin
salmon.72 Actually, the plaintiffs sought three remedies: 1) a harvest share, 2) inclusion of
hatchery fish in that harvest share, and 3) recognition that the treaty protected the fish at the
center of the treaty from habitat destruction.73 Judge George Boldt74 deferred acting on the latter
two requests until settling the first.75
After nearly four years of proceedings,76 Judge Boldt issued an historic and lengthy
decision on February 12, 1974, that invalidated Washington’s harvest regulations as

71

During the summer of 1970, activists conducted armed “fish ins” on the Puyallup
River. Federal agents raided a “fish in” encampment only weeks before the filing of United
States v. Washington. See Woods, supra note 62, at para. 54. See also ULRICH, supra note 51, at
133 (indicating “[d]iscrimination against treaty Indian fishing . . . actually increased”
immediately after the Belloni Decision).
72
United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979).
73
Id. at 328. See also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 80.
74
Judge Boldt, who was a named partner in a Seattle and a Tacoma law firm from 1928
until 1953 and also served as a state Assistant Attorney General in 1940 and 1950, was appointed
to the federal bench in 1953 by President Eisenhower, becoming Chief Judge of the Western
District of Washington in 1971. See Northwest Digital Archives, Guide to Papers of George H.
Boldt, 1971-73, http://nwda-db.wsulibs.wsu.edu/findaid/ark:/80444/xv35913 (last visited Jan. 27,
2009). Judge Boldt retired in 1979 and died on March 18, 1984. See Woods, supra note 62, at
para. 80; Paul Shukovsky, Alzheimer’s Strikes Indians Through Judge Boldt Had Disease When
He Issued Ruling, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 1992, at A1, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/archives/1992/9206110030.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2009)
(describing Judge Boldt’s battle with Alzheimer’s beginning in 1979).
75
Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 328 (noting the court would decided at a later time
“claims for relief concerning alleged destruction or impairment of treaty right fishing due to state
authorization of, or failure to prevent, logging and other industrial pollution and obstruction of
treaty right fishing streams”).
76
After three-and-a-half years of pre-trial proceedings, Judge Boldt conducted a threeweek trial, with 49 witnesses and hundreds of documents admitted. See Woods, supra note 62,
at para 59.
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discriminating against tribal fishing.77 The regulations restricted and sometimes prohibited tribal
fishing at historic fishing grounds while, as Judge Boldt found, “permitting [non-Indian] fishing
for salmon elsewhere on the same runs of fish.”78 The upshot was that at the time of trial the
tribes harvested just two percent of the total harvest.79 Moreover, despite the state’s claims of
Indian overharvests, during more than three years of taking evidence, Judge Boldt found that the
state failed to produce “any credible evidence showing any instance, remote or recent, when a
definitively identified member of any plaintiff tribe exercised his off-reservation treaty rights by
any conduct or means detrimental to the perpetuation of any species of anadromous fish.”80 In
short, the state was hardly discriminating against tribal harvests in the interest of conservation of
fish. Instead, it was discriminating against the tribes in order to conserve fish for competing nonIndian harvesters.81
Since the available salmon were insufficient to supply both Indian and non-Indian needs,
like Judge Belloni before him, Judge Boldt decided that the treaties required a fair allocation of
harvests.82 Judge Boldt, however, broke new ground by quantifying what that fair allocation
should be.83 He construed the treaty language “in common with” to mean “by dictionary

77

Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 393.
Id.
79
See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 n. 22 (1979) (citing United States
v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 1978)).
80
Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 338 n. 26.
81
As accurately predicted by Professor Johnson, supra note 52, at 208–09.
82
Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 343.
83
See Brian E. Schartz, Fishing For a Rule in a Sea of Standards: A Theoretical
Justification for the Boldt Decision, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 314, 332 (2007) (“[N]o prior decision
had gone so far as to derive a clear, bright-line rule form the Stevens treaties.”). Judge Belloni
viewed the 50% formula articulated by Judge Boldt as an improvement. Belloni Oral History,
supra note 69 (“In his opinion [Judge Belloni] followed mine exactly. In fact, he quoted
verbatim I think about five pages of my opinion in his. He made one change which I thought was
78
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definition and intended as used in the . . . treaties sharing equally the opportunity to take fish.”84
Consequently, he directed the state to limit the non-Indian share to fifty percent of the total
harvest.85 This directive altered salmon harvests in Puget Sound dramatically: by 1977, the
tribes were harvesting forty-three percent of Puget Sound harvests.86
But change did not come without widespread resistance. The Boldt Decision provoked a
wave of public outrage and dissidence unlike any the region had seen before, prompting the
Ninth Circuit later to compare the resistance to that of the Southern states’ defiance of school
desegregation orders.87 Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Boldt in 1976,88 non-Indian

a good one. . . . Judge Boldt clarified [the fair and equitable share concept] and he said that fair
and equitable share will be 50% of the fish.”).
84
Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 343.
85
Id. Judge Boldt excluded from the equal sharing formula 1) fish harvested by tribes
on-reservation, 2) fish not destined to pass the tribe’s historic fishing grounds, and 3) fish caught
outside Washington waters. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687–89.
86
See Brief of Respondent Indian Tribes at 59, Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Nos. 77-983, 78-119, and 78-139).
However, given the exclusions in Judge Boldt’s formula, supra note 85, the tribes actually
harvested only 18 percent of the total Washington harvest in 1977. Brief of Respondent Indian
Tribes, supra, at 59. Notwithstanding the definitive answer to the apportionment question, the
habitat degradation question remained unanswered. Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. at 328 (noting
the court would decide at a later time “claims for relief concerning alleged destruction or
impairment of treaty right fishing due to state authorization of, or failure to prevent, logging and
other industrial pollution and obstruction of treaty right fishing streams”). In part due to this
deferral and his correct assumption that additional issues would arise from the allocation
decision, Judge Boldt retained continuing jurisdiction “without limitation.” Id. at 347; see
Woods, supra note 62, at para. 64. Over the next three decades, the tribes would seek redress on
several more issues in subproceedings of United States v. Washington, including the claimed
right to habitat protection. See infra Parts III, V. Additionally, Judge Boldt’s 50% rule begged
the question whether hatchery fish should be included in the 50% allocation. Untied States v.
Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F.Supp. 187, 198–99 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part and
vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). Judge Orrick, the successor to the United States
v. Washington subproceedings answered this question in the affirmative. Id.
87
The state of Washington and its citizens resisted the Boldt Decision vigorously. See
Puget Sound Gillnetters v. U.S. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The state’s
extraordinary machinations in resisting [Judge Boldt’s] decree have forced the district court to
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harvesters engaged in widespread noncompliance with the federal court’s orders89 and succeeded
in collaterally attacking the federal court in state court, as the state supreme court ruled that the
state lacked authority under state statutes and the state constitution to implement the equalsharing formula.90 Consequently, from 1977 until 1979, Judge Boldt managed the Puget Sound
and coastal Washington fisheries himself, enforced by via court orders, criminal contempt
citations, and federal marshals.91 In short, he became a judicial fishmaster.92
The conflict between state and federal courts induced a reluctant Supreme Court to wade

take over a large share of the management of the state’s fishery in order to enforce its decrees.
Except for some desegregation cases the district court has faced the most concerted official and
private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century. The challenged
orders in this appeal must be reviewed by this court in the context of events forced by litigants
who offered the court no reasonable choice.”); Schartz, supra note 83, at 332–33 (describing
public outcry regarding the 50% rule and attributing the sentiment to the fact that Judge Boldt set
out a bright-line rule arising from the Stevens treaties for the first time in their history); Woods,
supra note 62, at para. 66.
88
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976).
89
By the time Judge Boldt issued his opinion, harvest levels were already reduced due to
seriously depleted salmon populations. Nikel-Zueger, supra note 9, at 14–15. Judge Boldt’s 50%
rule essentially reduced the harvest quota by half for non-Indian fisherman because the Indian
take prior to the ruling made up only about two percent of the total harvest. Passenger Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676–77 n. 22 (1979). Just three years after the Boldt Decision, the Indian
harvest reached 43% of Puget Sound’s total harvest (and about 18% of Washington’s total
harvest). See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 81 (noting non-compliance and
shooting threats). As a result, Washingtonians viciously hung Judge Boldt in effigy, sported
bumper stickers urging citizens to “Can Judge Boldt—Not Salmon,” and gathered 80,000
signatures supporting his impeachment. See Schartz, supra note 83, at 332.
90
Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash.
1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151
(Wash. 1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1,
at 81.
91
See Woods, supra note 62, at para. 77.
92
In doing so, he became a cautionary example for other federal judges who balked at
providing close judicial oversight of agencies managing other natural resources. See, e.g.,
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 624 F.Supp. 1045, 1062–63 (D. Nev. 1985) (in which Judge
Burns declined to assume the role of “rangemaster” of federal grazing lands in western Nevada).
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into the morass of the Northwest salmon wars for the fourth time in little over a decade. In 1979,
the Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, largely affirmed Judge Boldt.93
The Court employed a canon of treaty construction—that treaty terms should be interpreted as
the tribes would understand them94—to uphold the equal sharing principle.95 Justice Stevens
also observed the treaty right prevented tribal harvesters from being “crowded out” of their
fishery; thus, neither party could harvest the other’s share of the resource.96 According to the
Court,
[t]he logic of the 50% ceiling is manifest. For an equal division—especially
between parties who presumptively treated each other as equals—is suggested, if
not necessarily dictated, by the word ‘common’ as it appears in the treaties. Since
the days of Solomon, such a division has been accepted as a fair apportionment
of a common asset, and Anglo-American common law has presumed that division
when, as here, no other percentage is suggested by the language of the agreement
or the surrounding circumstances.97
The Court therefore affirmed Judge Boldt’s equal sharing principle.98
An enduring aspect of the Court’s affirmance was its adoption of a needs-based
“moderate living” standard as a measure of the scope of the treaty right of taking fish. Clarifying
that it meant the equal sharing principle to operate as a ceiling, the Court proclaimed that “the

93

Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
Id. at 676 (“[T]he treaty must therefore be construed not according to the technical
meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.”).
95
In addition to tribes’ likely understanding of the treaty language, the Court affirmed the
equal sharing formula by looking to contemporaneous usages of the word “common” and
interpretation of treaties with Great Britain giving each nation an equal harvest share. Id. at 677–
78.
96
Id. at 682.
97
Id. at 687 n. 27.
98
The Court did adjust the equal sharing formula in two ways: 1) it included onreservation harvests as well as ceremonial and subsistence harvest in the 50% tribal share; and 2)
it included in the non-tribal 50% only fish harvested by Washington citizens in state or federal
94
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central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that was once
thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is
necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”99 Thus,
under the “moderate living” standard, the tribal harvest share could be judicially reduced below
fifty percent if a tribe: 1) dwindled “to just a few members” or 2) found “other sources of
support that lead it to abandon its fisheries.”100 In the nearly thirty years since the Court’s
decision, no evidence of either of these qualifications has appeared. With the “moderate living”
qualification, the Supreme Court concluded the equitable apportionment era of litigation
surrounding the treaty fishing right. The final frontier of litigation would involve an attempt to
expand the number of salmon subject to apportionment.
III.

THE HABITAT RIGHT, 1970-2007: A LONG AND WINDING ROAD
By the time Judge Boldt issued his groundbreaking opinion, the salmon and steelhead

fisheries had faced over a century of decline, which made the allocation issue extraordinarily
contentious.101 As a result, the next subproceeding of United States v. Washington (commonly

waters. Id. at 688–89.
99
Id. at 686. For criticism of the Court’s adoption of this standard, see the articles cited
in Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 458 n. 246.
100
Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687. Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers
revealed that the insertion of the “moderate living” standard into the opinion was a result of an
effort by Justice Stevens to preserve a precarious majority. The three-member dissent, written by
Justice Powell, worried that equal sharing would produce “an extraordinary economic windfall to
Indian fishermen. . . . .” Id. at 705–06 (Powell, J., dissenting). The moderate living language, as
a ceiling on the tribal share, was a successful effort on the part of Justice Stevens to keep from
losing his majority. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1637–39 (1996) (noting
that Stevens thought that a 50% harvest share would yield only about 20% for tribal harvests,
assuming—erroneously, it turned out—that the tribes would be unable to successfully argue that
their treaty rights included harvests of hatchery fish).
101
See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
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referred to as “Phase II”) involved tribal efforts to expand the “pie” to be allocated.102
In 1970, when the tribes filed suit in Judge Boldt’s court, they not only sought a share of
the salmon harvests, but also inclusion of hatchery fish in their harvest share and a declaration
that the treat-protected “right of taking fish” included protection of the habitat that allowed the
fish to exist.103 Judge Boldt deferred the latter two issues until he resolved the harvest share
question.104 By the time the Supreme Court decided that the treaties did indeed guarantee the
tribes a harvest share in 1979,105 Judge Boldt had retired, and Judge William Orrick had replaced
him on the case.106
Taking a common sense approach, Judge Orrick had little difficulty ruling, in 1980, that
hatchery fish were included in the tribal harvestable share, and that the treaties protected fish
habitat.107 The state had argued that hatchery fish should be excluded from the equal sharing

102

See Lewis, supra note 31, at 297 (“The problem for Indians today is not their piece of
the pie, it is the size of the pie. To address the size of the pie, some courts have considered the
proposed habitat right.”).
103
See supra notes 73 and 75 and accompanying text.
104
Boldt Decision, 384 F.Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (noting the court would
decided at a later time “claims for relief concerning alleged destruction or impairment of treaty
right fishing due to state authorization of, or failure to prevent, logging and other industrial
pollution and obstruction of treaty right fishing streams”).
105
See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text.
106
See supra note 74 for biographical information on Judge Boldt. Judge Orrick, of the
Northern District of California, joined his father’s San Francisco law firm before serving in
President John F. Kennedy’s Justice Department. Larken Bradley, Judge William Orrick, 87, A
Stinson Beach Pundit (obituary), POINT REYES LIGHT, Sept. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.ptreyeslight.com/stories/sept18_03/orrick_obit.html. President Richard Nixon
appointed him to the federal bench in 1974. Id. When no members of the Western District of
Washington wanted the notoriety that United States v. Washington had brought Judge Boldt,
Judge Orrick was assigned the case. See Lewis, supra note 31, at 296. Judge Orrick died in
2003 at the age of 87. See Bradley, supra.
107
United States v. Washington (Orrick Decision), 506 F.Supp. 187, 197–98, 208 (W.D.
Wash. 1980), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc).
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formula, encouraged by Supreme Court concurrence in Puyallup II.108 But Judge Orrick ruled
that the hatchery fish were included in the equal sharing formula because hatcheries were the
state’s (and federal government’s) overwhelming choice for mitigation of the adverse effects of
the effects of aquatic developments, particularly dam construction and operation, on salmon.109
Concerning the habitat issue, Judge Orrick also ruled in favor of the tribes, concluding
that the “right of taking” fish implied a right to protect the habitat necessary to sustain the
salmon runs.110 He did so on the ground that “[t]he most fundamental prerequisite to exercising
the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken.”111 Orrick determined that the Supreme
Court had found that the primary purpose of the treaties was to reserve fish in order to preserve
an economic and cultural way of life.112 Moreover, the treaty negotiators “specifically assured
the tribes that they could continue to fish notwithstanding the changes the impending westward
expansion would certainly entail.”113 Since maintenance of fish habitat was a prerequisite to the
survival of the salmon that were the primary purpose of the treaty, he concluded that the treaties

108

In Puyallup II, the Court avoided ruling on whether the state could exclude hatchery
fish from the equal sharing formula. 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973). A three-member concurrence,
written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, suggested that
the equal sharing formula should not apply to hatchery fish, apparently on the theory that these
fish were “created” by the state’s labor. Id. at 49–50 (White, J., concurring).
109
Orrick Decision, 506 F.Supp. at 198–99. Judge Orrick concluded that hatchery fish
were subject to the treaties because 1) the treaties reserved to the tribes “more than a share of the
[treaty-time] harvests; they also reserved a right to all future runs;” 2) the state didn’t own the
hatchery fish once released to state waters; and 3) the state supplied “only a portion of the
hatchery fish,” as federal, tribal, private, and cooperative hatcheries accounted for nearly half of
the hatchery fish. Id. at 200–02.
110
Id. at 203.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 204.
113
Id.
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must be interpreted to protect that habitat if the reserved right of taking fish was to have value.114
Given the compromised state of salmonid habitat, Washington could not degrade or allow
activities that degrade habitat, since they impeded the tribes’ ability to make a “moderate living”
through fishing.115 Otherwise, the treaty right “would eventually be reduced to the right to dip
one’s net into the water and bring it out empty,” which would render the Phase I efforts to
establish the proper harvest allocation “nugatory.”116 In other words, if the fish went extinct, the
right to take half of the harvest would become “meaningless and valueless.”117 The opinion
marked a major advance for the tribes, but its effects would not be long-lasting.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Orrick Decision on three separate occasions. Initially, in
1983, a three-judge panel upheld, but significantly modified, Judge Orrick’s finding of an
implied habitat right.118 Whereas Judge Orrick required the state to avoid habitat degradation
that would interfere with the tribes’ right to a “moderate living,” the panel replaced the standard
with a reasonableness test, rejecting what the appellate court characterized as an “environmental

114

Id. at 203
Id. Judge Orrick held this prohibition also ran against the federal government and
private parties. Id. at 206. Note, however, the plaintiffs agreed to defer the question of whether
the state of Washington had violated that duty and, if so, what the remedy would be. Id. at 194.
116
Id. at 203 (paraphrasing Justice Stevens’ statement in Passenger Fishing Vessel that
the treaty right entailed more than “merely the chance . . . occasionally to dip their nets into the
territorial waters”).
117
Id. at 205.
118
United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983). This panel and each of
the later en banc panels affirmed Judge Orrick’s decision that the state should include hatchery
fish in the number to be allocated between Indians and nonIndians. Id. at 1380. With regard to
Judge Orrick’s articulation of the habitat protection right, however, the 3-judge panel lodged four
primary objections: “the absence of a basis in precedent, the lack of theoretical or practical
necessity for the right, its unworkably complex standard of liability, and its potential for
disproportionately disrupting essential economic development.” Id. at 1381.
115
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servitude with open-ended and unforeseeable consequences.”119 Instead, the panel majority, in
an opinion by Judge Joseph Sneed, held that both the state and the tribes had to “take reasonable
steps commensurate with their respective resources and abilities to preserve and enhance the
fishery.”120 Further, Judge Sneed ruled, without explanation, that the treaty obligations did not
run to private parties.121 Judge Reinhart concurred in the majority’s holding, stating he saw little
practical difference between the reasonableness standard and Judge Orrick’s articulation of the
treaty right.122 However, Reinhart minced no words in saying he thought the treaty right did, in
fact, guarantee the salmon supply would be safeguarded from severe habitat degradation.123
The tribes petitioned for rehearing, and an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed to
reevaluate the case.124 At first, the eleven-judge panel ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the case.125 But the fractured en banc panel later withdrew its earlier opinion, vacated
Judge Sneed’s opinion, and also vacated Judge Orrick’s decision as to the habitat right in a per
curiam opinion.126 The court noted declaratory relief should be reserved for cases amenable to

119

Id.
Id.
121
Id. at 1381 n. 15; Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 417 n. 43 (noting this holding was
blatantly inconsistent with Winans decision).
122
United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1390 (J. Reinhart, concurring).
123
Id. at 1391 (“If it is inconceivable that the Indians would have agreed to be required to
fish on the same terms as non-Indians, it is far more inconceivable that they would have allowed
the State to permit the fishery to be destroyed altogether. . . . [T]he treaty guarantees that the
Indians’ supply of fish must be safeguarded against pollution by every reasonable means.”).
124
See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 417.
125
Id. (citing United States v. Washington, No. 81-3111, slip op. 5397 (9th Cir. Dec. 17,
1984) (en banc), vacated, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
126
United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 994 (1985) (Phase II). The en banc panel, like the initial Ninth Circuit panel,
affirmed the lower court decision on the hatchery issue, determining that the issue was
sufficiently particularized. Id. at 1357–60 (affirming Judge Orrick’s holding that hatchery fish
must be counted in the tribe’s allocation, but noting the judge improperly concluded the 50%
120
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“[p]recise resolution, not general admonition.”127 According to the plurality, as a matter of
judicial prudence, Judge Orrick should not have ruled on the environmental degradation issue
without the benefit of a particularized factual dispute: “The legal standards that will govern the
State’s precise obligations and duties under the treaty with respect to the myriad State actions
that may affect the environment of the treaty area will depend for their definition and
articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case.”128 Despite the
vacatur, neither the per curium opinion nor any of the several concurrences and dissents
indicated any of the judges would reverse Judge Orrick’s habitat holding on the merits.129 Still,
perhaps due to the uncertain scope of the habitat obligations, the court was unwilling to affirm
without a concrete factual scenario.130

tribal share was a minimum share when the Supreme Court held in Passenger Fishing Vessel that
it was subject to a downward adjustment if the “moderate living” standard was met at a lower
quantity).
127
Id. at 1357.
128
Id. (emphasis added).
129
See generally id. Judge Ferguson, joined by Judge Schroeder, thought that the
plaintiffs’ original complaint with its request to enjoin eight specific state activities “would have
presented a justiciable controversy,” but the procedural posture of the case did not allow the
court to affirm because Judge Orrick decided the scope of the habitat right “as a pure issue of law
divorced from any factual context” in a decision on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1360
(Ferguson, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Nelson, joined by Judge Skopil, indicated that not
only did the majority erroneously conclude a declaratory judgment was unripe at that juncture,
but would have affirmed Judge Orrick’s decision on the merits of the environmental degradation
issue. Id. at 1362–63, 1365–67 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Norris dissented from the majority’s vacatur, but, unlike Judge Nelson, would not reach the
merits of the environmental degradation question because the plurality opinion had not. Id. at
1368 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Poole, in dissent, wrote the
Ninth Circuit had no business ruling on interlocutory rulings of the trial court until the remaining
issues (i.e., the particular state actions that caused environmental degradation and the remedy)
had been decided by the district court. Id. at 1370–71 (Poole, J., dissenting). See also Piscary
Profit, supra note 9, at 496 n. 449 (indicating no Ninth Circuit judge has ever held the habitat
protection right did not exist in this or any other case).
130
One of us has suggested the en banc panel may have vacated Judge Orrick’s ruling on
-29-

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223

The Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to reach the merits left the tribes, in the spring of 1985,
essentially in the same position regarding the habitat question as they were in 1974. They
declined, however, to accept the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to present more particularized facts
for nearly two more decades, pursuing negotiation and cooperative management options
instead.131 Eventually, the tribes recognized that their efforts failed to stem the decline of the
salmon runs, and turned to the culvert issue as their factual vehicle for deciding the habitat
protection question.132

the right to habitat protection due to erroneous concerns that it implied a “wilderness servitude,”
which could halt all development in the region and potentially require a return to 1855 habitat
conditions. See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 489–92.
131
See id. at 418 (describing tactics tribes pursued in the interim); SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 251–52 (same); Schartz, supra note 83, at 339–41 (same). In the
meantime (and even before the Orrick Decision), several court opinions seemed to accept an
implied habitat right under the treaties without expressly addressing the question by enjoining
certain habitat damaging activities based on the treaty fishing right. See Piscary Profit, supra
note 9, at 462–81 (describing cases involving dam operations and construction; pipeline, marina
and fish farm development; and reserved water right adjudications); SACRIFICING THE SALMON,
supra note 1, at 252–63 (same); Lewis, supra note 31, at 298–99 (describing some of the same
cases); see also infra Part VII.
132
See, e.g., Lynda V. Mapes, Another Potential Lightening Boldt, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
17, 2001, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20010117&slug=culverts17m0 (last
visited Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Mapes, Another Potential Lightening Boldt] (noting that in
2001 the tribes were catching the same amount of fish as in 1974 and quoting Phil Katzen, one of
the tribes’ attorneys, as saying “[t]he tribes have lost everything they gained in the Boldt
decision”); Andrew Engelson, Tribes Fight to Clear the Roads for Salmon, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, July 2, 2001, available at http://www.hcn.org/issues/206/10611 (indicating tribes took
500,000 fish in the early 1970s, increased the take to 5 million by the mid-1980s, but decreased
take to 500,000 fish by 2000 due to declining salmon populations). The tribes thought that
neither further harvest limitations nor hatchery reforms would help salmon populations as habitat
continued to be degraded or lost, in part due to passage-blocking culverts. See Billy Frank, Jr.,
Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Being Frank: Culvert Ruling Benefits Salmon
Everyone, Sept. 4, 2007, available at
http://blogs.nwifc.org/weblog/beingfrank/2007/09/being_frank_cul.html (“Without good habitat,
and access to that habitat, there will be no salmon recovery.”).
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IV.

CULVERTS:
PROTECTION

CRYSTALLIZING

THE

RIGHT

TO

SALMON

HABITAT

Before turning to the Martinez Decision, a brief primer on culverts and their effects on
salmon is in order. A culvert is a pipe or arch, generally made from metal or concrete, used to
allow water to flow underneath roads and railroad tracks where they cross waterways.133 Culverts
are often a cheaper alternative to bridges that still allow water to follow its natural course and
prevent road erosion and floods.134 In spite of these benefits, culvert design flaws have created a
serious impediment to anadromous fish access to spawning and rearing habitat.135 Most culverts
were built at a time when few worried that various runs of Pacific salmon would go extinct.136
Those times have long since passed, and the general consensus today is that something must be

133

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESTORING FISH PASSAGE THROUGH
CULVERTS ON FOREST SERVICE AND BLM LANDS IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON COULD TAKE
DECADES 5 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02136.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. Note that the General Accounting Office changed its name in 2004 to the Government
Accountability Office. David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a Name?
ROLL CALL, July 19, 2004, available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/50_8/guest/6262-1.html.
134
See Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe Replaces Culvert in Creek, NWIFC NEWS (Northwest
Indian Fisheries Comm’n, Olympia, WA), Fall 2008, at 12, available at
http://www.nwifc.wa.gov/newsinfo/documents/newsletters/2008_3_Fall.pdf
135
See EVA WILDER & MIKE BARBER, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION & WASH.
ST. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, WSDOT FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY: PROGRESS PERFORMANCE
REPORT 6 (2008), available at http://wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F9743AD2-B4DB-439E-91C5B973CBF17506/0/WSDOTFishPassageRpt08.pdf [hereinafter FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY]. For
example, many culverts have a hatch at one end that opens with increased precipitation, but
barely opens at normal flows, thereby prohibiting fish passage. Schartz, supra note 83, at 315 n.
2.
136
See Engelson, supra note 132; See also Lynda V. Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles to
Salmon, State, Politics, Seattle Times, Jan. 24, 2008, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2004142062_culverts24m.html [hereinafter
Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles] (noting culverts were “built with only one thing in mind:
getting water down straight pipes, as cheaply as possible. No one was thinking about getting
salmon back up them.”).
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done about culverts’ adverse effects on fish passage.137
Poorly constructed or maintained culverts impede access to habitat in several ways.138
First, if a culvert outlet is placed too high above a stream, it may exceed salmon’s jumping
capabilities, preventing anadromous fish from gaining access to upstream spawning and rearing
freshwater habitat.139 Second, improperly designed culverts may be too steep, which allows
water to flow through them too swiftly for salmon to fight against the current.140 Third, the
depth of water inside culverts may be too shallow to allow fish passage.141 Finally, culverts can
become blocked with debris or sediment, obstructing access to upstream habitat and creating
turbulence too great for fish to overcome.142 Consequently, culverts cause thousands of miles of
prime spawning and rearing habitat to remain inaccessible to salmonids, and impede other
salmon recovery efforts.143

137

Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles, supra note 136. Fish passage is particularly
important for anadromous fish due to their migratory life cycle. Anadromous fish are born in
freshwater streams, grow as juveniles in freshwater streams, migrate to the ocean to mature, and
return to their natal streams in order to spawn. See GAO REPORT, supra note 133, at 4.
Consequently, culverts that block access to freshwater habitat have “the potential to destroy these
populations of wild fish.” FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
138
Salmon survival depends on the salmon’s ability to “to migrate to the sea, feed on its
rich food resources, and return to spawn in the clean gravel and oxygen rich waters found in the
state [of Washington’s] 50,000 miles of streams.” FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 6. For a detailed discussion of effects of culverts on salmonids, see WASH. DEP’T OF
FISH & WILDLIFE, DESIGN OF ROAD CULVERTS FOR FISH PASSAGE MANUAL 9–13 (2003),
available at http://wdfw.wa.gov/hab/engineer/cm/culvert_manual_final.pdf [hereinafter FISH
PASSAGE MANUAL].
139
Washington State Dep’t of Transportation, Fish Passage Facts,
http://wsdot.wa.gov/Environment/Biology/FP/fishpassagefacts.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter Fish Passage Facts]. This type of culvert is known as a “perched” culvert.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. See also Mapes, Another Potential Lightening Boldt, supra note 132 (describing
culverts’ effects on fish passage).
143
FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that, as of 1997,
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The state of Washington now regulates construction of new stream crossing structures in
a way that is much more protective of anadromous fish habitat and passage.144 For example, the
state has established a preference for bridges as water crossing structures.145 Where a bridge is

Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife estimated barrier culverts blocked access to more
than 3,000 miles of habitat and that that number should be “viewed as conservative”). See also
FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 135, at 9 (noting WSDOT-owned culverts block
thousands of miles of potential salmonid habitat); FISH PASSAGE MANUAL, supra note 138, at 13
(“Barriers block the use of the upper watershed, which is often the most productive spawning
habitat, considering channel size, substrate and available rearing habitats. Fish access to upper
portions of the watershed is important; fry produced there then have access to the entire
downstream watershed for rearing.”); Press Release, Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission,
Questions and Answers Regarding the Tribal Culvert Case (Jan. 16, 2001), available at
http://blogs.nwifc.org/weblog/general/2001/01/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008) [NWIFC Press
Release].
144
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-110-070 (2008) (describing hierarchy of stream-crossing
structures); WASH. REV. CODE § 77.57.030 (2008) (describing penalties for failure to remove
obstructions or failure to construct fishways). In fact, since 1881, the state has had laws on the
books to protect anadromous fish access to habitat by prohibiting construction of human-made
barriers. FISH PASSAGE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6 (citing “Chapter 75.20.060,
75.20.061, 77.12.425, and 77.16.210 RCW [Appendix A]”). However, notwithstanding these
early laws, culverts have been allowed to impede access. Id.
Beyond the failures of early laws to prevent the construction of so many problem
culverts, the tribes dispute the sufficiency of the modern culvert laws, as well:
First, the State says that its statutes require fish passage through culverts.
It fails to note that the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) provisions
implementing those laws, WAC 220-110-070, establish outdated design standards
that largely neglect the passage of juvenile salmon. The State touts WDFW’s
updated culvert design guidance, but that guidance is voluntary; only the
inadequate standards defined by the WAC are enforceable, and only the WAC
standards are used to assess whether a culvert is a fish passage barrier.
Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Opposition to State’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, United
States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213) (citations omitted).
145
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-110-070 (“In fish bearing waters, bridges are preferred as
water crossing structures by the department in order to ensure free and unimpeded fish passage
for adult and juvenile fishes and preserve spawning and rearing habitat. . . . Other structures
which may be approved, in descending order of preference, include: Temporary culverts,
bottomless arch culverts, arch culverts, and round culverts. Corrugated metal culverts are
generally preferred over smooth surfaced culverts. Culvert baffles and downstream control weirs
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infeasible, the regulations prefer temporary culverts over permanent culverts.146
permanent culverts are necessary, they may not obstruct fish passage.147

Where

When approving

permanent culverts, the Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) and the
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) favor “stream simulation” design
because “it best mimics the conditions found in the natural streambed at the culvert site.”148
Despite these forward-looking regulations and practices, Washington was not always so
concerned about the effects of culverts on salmon. In 2001, by its own estimates, the state
owned 2,400 “barrier culverts.”149
Washington does not dispute the adverse effects of barrier culverts or the benefits of
attending to them, but progress repairing or replacing culverts has been slow. In 1997, the state
reported that more than 200,000 additional adult salmon would likely return to western
Washington if it fixed its culverts, but indicated in 2001 that it would take up to one hundred
years to do so using existing funding sources.150 By June 2008, the state had fixed only 218
barrier culverts since 1991 (roughly nine percent), and forty-eight of those still required

are discouraged except to correct fish passage problems at existing structures.”). Further, the
manual used by the state agencies for culverts design recommends minimizing the total number
of stream crossings as much as possible. FISH PASSAGE MANUAL, supra note 138, at 9.
146
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 220-110-070 (2008).
147
Id. § 220-110-070(3)(a).
148
Fish Passage Facts, supra note 139 (“Culverts designed to simulate natural
streambeds are constructed wider than the existing stream channel width, and sloped at a similar
gradient as the existing natural stream. Our approach to a stream simulation culvert is a
bottomless culvert placed over a natural streambed. Use of stream simulation culverts is based on
the principle that, if fish can migrate through the natural channel, they can also migrate through a
man-made culvert that simulates the stream channel.”); see also FISH PASSAGE MANUAL, supra
note 138, at ch. 6 (describing technical aspects of “stream-simulation design”).
149
See Engelson, supra note 132. “Barrier culverts” are those that exist in salmonbearing streams and impede fish passage in some way.
150
Id.
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“additional work to meet current fish passage criteria.”151 The most recent WDFW and WSDOT
culvert inventory in 2008 estimated the number of state-owned culverts in fish-bearing streams at
3,185.152 Of these, 1,859 block fish passage, and 1,440 of them are barriers that, if fixed, would
result in “significant habitat gain.”153 According to the state agencies, “significant habitat gain”
means culvert repair will open fish access to at least an additional 200 meters of upstream
habitat.154 The state prioritizes these culverts for “near-term correction using dedicated fish
passage barrier correction funds.”155 In total, repair or replacement of these barrier culverts
would open more than 3,000 miles of potential salmonid habitat.156

However, over the

seventeen-year period between 1991 and 2008, the state opened only 486 miles of habitat.157
This sluggish rate of improvement is largely a consequence of the fact that culvert
replacement and repair is extraordinarily expensive.158 Average estimates for culvert corrections

151

FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 135, at 5; see also Fish Passage Facts, supra
note 139 (noting the 218 barrier culverts fixed opened 486 miles of habitat).
152
FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 135, at 5.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 6.
155
Id. Washington addresses culverts problems in three ways: 1) every two years, “the
Legislature appropriates funds for stand-alone correction projects to address some of the highest
priority barriers,” which are called “dedicated correction” projects and are part of the WSDOT
Environmental Retrofit Program; 2) in highway safety projects, WSDOT requires correction of
barrier culverts if the project requires a Hydraulic Project Approval (HPA) and evaluates
whether barrier culverts should be corrected if no HPA is required; and 3) state agencies correct
some barrier culverts through routine maintenance. Id. at 9. See also Fish Passage Facts, supra
note 139 (describing the three-pronged approach to prioritization and factors used).
156
FISH PASSAGE INVENTORY, supra note 135, at 9. Several years might elapse before
salmon actually use newly opened habitat even after culvert replacement. Id.
157
Fish Passage Facts, supra note 139.
158
See Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Opposition to State’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 144, at 22 (“State witnesses concede that past repair funding has been inadequate, that
increased funding is conditional on legislative commitment, that repair of all State barrier
culverts may take several decades, and that repairs on State forest lands may not meet the
regulatory deadline of 2016.” (citations omitted)),
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vary wildly, but range anywhere from $250,000159 to $369,000 per culvert.160 WSDOT reports
that it has spent $46 million on culverts since 1991—$20 million on inventory efforts and $26
million to correct some 218 culverts.161 Using the latter figures, the state spent an average
$119,266 per culvert repair, which is the most conservative estimate available.162 Accordingly,
the total cost of fixing the thousands of state-owned culverts is in the hundreds of millions of
dollars.163
Due to the prohibitive cost of culvert repairs, when the tribes broached the topic of the
culverts’ effect on the tribal salmon harvest with the state, the parties made little headway,
despite several major attempts to come to an agreement.164 Eventually, the tribes determined

159

Mapes, Another Potential Lightening Boldt, supra note 132; Christopher Schwarzen,
Many Culverts Blocking Fish, 5-Year Study Finds, SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 2005, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20050615&slug=culverts15e.
160
Robert McClure, Who Would Be a “Greener” Governor?, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Oct. 15, 2008, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/383330_greengov16.html?source=rss (indicating that, in
Governor Christine Gregoire’s first term, the state remedied approximately 70 culverts, at an
average cost of $369,000 per culvert).
161
Fish Passage Facts, supra note 139. Of course, the cost of each culvert depends on
the design required. Washington state agencies follow WDFW’s Design of Road Culverts for
Fish Passage Manual to determine the type of correction option to use at a particular site that
will maximize fish passage. See generally FISH PASSAGE MANUAL, supra note 138.
162
Note, however, that 48 of the culverts repaired need further work. See supra note 151
and accompanying text. Dino Rossi, Washington’s 2008 Republican candidate for governor,
seemed to estimate culvert repairs at about $120,000 per culverts based on these numbers. Dino
Rossi: Q&A About the Environment, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 14, 2008, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/383248_rossi14.html. However, the Seattle PostIntelligencer reported that the figure was very low in comparison to what the state has actually
been spending on stream crossings ($369,000 per culvert). McClure, supra note 160.
163
See Lynda v. Mapes, Culvert Ruling Backs Tribes, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003849269_culvert23m.html.
164
See Editorial, Unplug the Culverts, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20010304&slug=culverted05
[hereinafter Unplug the Culverts] (“Three major attempts to settle this dispute, plus mediation,
have failed. The state is hung up on budgeting particulars, and the tribe wants the state to
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they would need to seek judicial resolution of the issue.165 If the Ninth Circuit thought a
particularized fact scenario was necessary to evaluate the habitat right, the tribes could not have
chosen a more ingenious set of facts to crystallize the implied right to habitat protection. Unlike
many other threats to salmon, barrier culverts present a very tangible threat to salmon
populations because everything about them is quantifiable and observable.166 The state owns a
known number of culverts. Of those culverts, a certain percentage are blocked. Due to the
blockages, a quantifiable length of stream miles are unavailable for spawning and rearing habitat.
Because that habitat is unavailable, a calculable amount of fish do not exist for the tribes to
harvest in order to make a moderate living. Moreover, through a variety of reports drafted by
Washington state agencies, the state already had documented the serious consequences of
culverts on salmonid populations and eliminated considerable uncertainty as to the numbers at
issue.167 In short, the tribes were in a very strong position as they again prepared to establish the
habitat right in court.168
V.

THE 2007 MARTINEZ DECISION: REAFFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF THE
HABITAT RIGHT
On January 17, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice and twenty tribes filed suit against

acknowledge a treaty right to fix the culverts.”).
165
See id. (editorializing that tribes were forced into court because the state was bent on
proceeding at its own speed).
166
In contrast, the effects of pollution or urbanization on salmon populations, for
example, are much more difficult to document, and their effects on salmon populations are not as
obvious as a culvert outfall raised six feet above a stream.
167
See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 177–180 and
accompanying text.
168
See Unplug the Culverts, supra note 164 (“So everyone lurches back to federal court,
where many years and many, many thousands of dollars later a judge will ask if the state
bothered to read the Boldt . . . decision.”).
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the state of Washington in a sub-proceeding to Phase II of United States v. Washington.169
Although this “Request for Determination” centered on a much narrower issue than the prior
lines of cases, in that it dealt solely with the state’s treaty obligation to minimize the effects of
culverts under state roads on fish passage, observers understood the significance of the case.170
Lynda Mapes, a long-time reporter on salmon issues for the Seattle Times, entitled her article on
the lawsuit’s filing “Another Potential Lightening Boldt,” denoting its gravity.171 From the
outset, the case was potentially about much more than culverts172—it sought to reestablish the

169

Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *1; Mapes, Another Potential Lightening
Boldt, supra note 132. In addition, Columbia River tribes—the Nez Perce Tribe, Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservations—filed amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff tribes’ motion for
summary judgment and in response to the state’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See Brief
for Nez Perce, Warm Springs and Umatilla Tribes as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff Tribes,
United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213).
170
See, e.g. Schartz, supra note 83, at 316 (“[W]hen the case was first filed, Curt Smitch,
then the top salmon aide to the former governor of Washington, publicly characterized the
culvert litigation as “Boldt II” that could prioritize the rights of Indians above non-Indians.”).
171
Mapes, Another Potential Lightening Boldt, supra note 132.
172
See id. (“At the very least, the legal action could compel the state to spend hundreds of
millions of dollars to repair state highway culverts that affect fish runs for Western Washington
tribes—a tall order in a state strapped for highway funds. But the impact could potentially be far
greater. At its most potent, the case could establish a broader state duty to address any stateauthorized activity that hurts salmon survival, from water use to timber practices and
development. In a memorandum from tribal attorneys to a mediator attempting to fend off the
suit last September, the tribes made it clear their goal was not just getting culverts fixed, but also
‘to have the treaty right to protect fish habitat acknowledged by the state of Washington.’ Gov.
Gary Locke and Attorney General Christine Gregoire issued a joint statement yesterday decrying
the lawsuit. ‘We are aware this case has potential significance beyond the culvert issue,’ Locke
and Gregoire wrote in their statement. ‘A favorable ruling for the tribes could impose a duty that
may affect other public roadways, public facilities and lands and even the regulation of land use
and water.’”); Engelson, supra note 132 (quoting Curt Smitch as saying “They (the tribes) made
it clear to us, very explicitly, that the issue is not about culverts, but that this issue is about the
larger duty that they believe is required by the treaties. . . . When you talk about a duty to avoid
impacting the environment that fish spawn in and are reared in, then you’re talking about landuse practices and water. The state is simply not going to relinquish its authority over those
issues.”).
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right to habitat protection that slipped through the tribes’ fingers when the Ninth Circuit vacated
Judge Orrick’s decision.173
This time the plaintiffs brought a case involving the type of particularized factual
scenario the Ninth Circuit seemed to have in mind.174 Not only did they limit the habitatdegrading activity for which they sought resolution of the treaty right to culverts, they limited the
scope of the lawsuit both by geography and culvert type. Geographically, the case pertained
only to culverts north of the Columbia River and west of the Cascade Mountains.175 It also
narrowly focused on “barrier culverts under state roads that affect salmon runs passing through
the tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing areas.”176 The plaintiffs concentrated on the numbers
Washington described in the 1997 WSDOT and WDFW report, which indicated numerous

173

In 1980, the plaintiffs asked Judge Orrick to pass first on the legal question of
“whether the tribes’ fishing right include[d] the right to have treaty fish protected from
environmental degradation.” Orrick Decision, 506 F.Supp. 187, 202 (1980). They left the
questions of whether the state of Washington had violated the treaty fishing right by permitting
certain destructive activities, as well as what the remedy would be if it had, for another day,
which never came. Id. at 194.
174
See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see
supra notes 127–132 and accompanying text; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 3, United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (No. 70-9213) (“This sub-proceeding is brought in response to the direction of the Ninth
Circuit to seek confirmation of the treaty right in a particular fact context.”). Culverts were not
the first concrete factual scenario for which the tribes sought resolution of the habitat right, but
the earlier disputes settled out of court and are not a matter of public record. Telephone
Interview with Peter C. Monson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Denver, Colo. (Oct. 28,
2008) (notes on file with authors). Further, the tribes engaged in discussions with the state over
culvert repair prior to filing the lawsuit, but the negotiations became deadlocked over a repair
timetable and broke down “when the tribes insisted the state admit it had a treaty-mandated
obligation to maintain salmon at harvestable levels, not just recover the fish listed under the
Endangered Species Act.” Engelson, supra note 132.
175
See Mapes, Culvert Ruling Backs Tribes, supra note 163; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174, at 10 n. 3 (indicating case area
roughly conformed to state of Washington’s Northwest and Olympic regions).
176
See NWIFC Press Release, supra note 143; Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of
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culverts under state roads in the case area needed repair or replacement.177 Of these, 268 culverts
blocked significant amounts of habitat, including 249 linear miles of salmon spawning and
rearing habitat upstream of the blockages.178

Thus, “more than 400,000 square meters of

productive spawning habitat, and more than 1.5 million square meters of productive rearing
habitat for juvenile fish” were cut off.179 The state report concluded “removal of the obstacles
would result in an annual increase of 200,000 fish, many of which would be available for Tribal
harvest.”180
In their opening brief, the tribes framed their arguments to underscore the effect of
habitat degradation on the tribes’ ability to achieve the “moderate living” standard established by
Justice Stevens in Passenger Fishing Vessel.181

Because the state had constructed and

maintained culverts in a manner that degraded fish habitat, adult fish production declined which,
in turn, reduced the number of fish available for the tribal harvest.182 According to the tribes,
state actions that diminished the total number of harvestable fish impermissibly interfered with

Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174, at 9–11.
177
Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 10.
178
Id. (indicating 1997 report initially identified 268 barrier culverts, but, in its 2006
Progress Report, the state increased the number to 1,136 barrier culverts, which blocked eight
times as many stream miles as originally estimated). These numbers reflected only the culverts
that WSDOT maintained. Id. In addition, the tribes noted a partial inventory by the Washington
State Department of Parks and Recreation (WDP) and the Washington State Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) located another 750 barrier culverts on their lands within the case area.
Id. at 10–11.
179
United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 24371166, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007)
(Martinez Decision) (citing tribes’ Request for Determination).
180
Id.
181
See Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
174, at 2–5.
182
Id. at 3–4; Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 24371166, at *3.
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the tribes’ ability to earn a moderate living from their treaty fisheries.183 In support, the tribes
cited each of the long line of cases discussed in Section II of this article.184 As they had done in
the past, the plaintiff tribes maintained the reserved water rights doctrine (another implied
reservation of rights) supported their position by analogy, although they noted that the express
treaty fishing right in the Stevens treaties made the existence of an implied habitat right even
clearer.185

The tribes also argued that the Ninth Circuit and other courts had long held

interference with the tribal fishing right through “degradation of or construction in salmon

183

Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 4. The federal government framed the right slightly more narrowly, indicating the remedy
should “focus on those culverts that have more than a de minimis impact on the fishery.” Brief of
United States in Response to Washington’s Summary Judgment Motion and Amici Counties
Memorandum in Support Thereof at 6, 18, United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213) (“‘The right of taking fish secured to the plaintiff tribes in the
Stevens Treaties imposes a duty upon the State of Washington to refrain from degrading the
fishery resource through the construction or maintenance of culverts under State owned roads
and highways in a way that deprives the Tribes of a moderate living from the fishery.’ In our
view, this duty does not extend to every culvert owned by the State, but rather to those Stateowned culverts that appreciably degrade fish passage and interfere with the Tribes’ ability to
realize a moderate living from the Fishery.” (citing United States’ Response to Request for
Determination, Subproceeding 01-1, Doc. No. 4, at 3 (Jan. 16, 2001))).
184
Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 12–17. The tribes’ brief also discussed cases that indirectly examined the habitat right. See
infra Part VI.
185
Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 17–19. The tribes relied on three famous Supreme Court cases for the reserved rights
argument. First, in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court held a
treaty ceding vast areas of tribal land for white settlement in exchange for a reservation on which
Indians would become self-sustaining farmers impliedly reserved the water necessary for
farming, even though the treaty contained not a word about water. Id. at 17–18. Second, the
Supreme Court ruled in Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918), that
reservation of the Annette Islands for Alaska Natives to become “civilized” through use of the
fisheries resource impliedly reserved the water surrounding the island, thereby prohibiting nonIndians’ use of fish traps without tribal permission. Id. at 18. Finally, in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963) the Supreme Court decided that reservations of land for tribal use
necessarily included an implied right to water from the Colorado River sufficient to satisfy
present and future needs of the animals and crops on which the tribes depended. Id. at 18–19.
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habitat” constituted a violation of the treaty fishing right.186

Consequently, “[s]tate-owned

culverts [that] result in the loss of hundreds of miles of fish habitat that would otherwise produce
fish, a portion of which would have been available for Tribal treaty harvest” needed to make a
moderate living, violated the Stevens treaties.187
As for relief, the tribes sought a declaratory judgment, a prohibitory injunction, and a
mandatory injunction.188 First, they wanted a declaratory judgment acknowledging that the
treaty fishing right imposed a duty on the state to refrain from degrading habitat through building
and maintaining passage-blocking culverts, and that the state of Washington had violated and
continued to violate that duty.189 Second, they requested an injunction prohibiting the state from
building or maintaining any culverts that reduced the number of fish passing to or from the
tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds.190

Finally, the plaintiffs asked the court to require

Washington to “(1) identify, within eighteen months, the location of all culverts constructed or

186

Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 19–22 (citing No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F.Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (enjoining
construction of oil pipeline through Puget Sound region); Umatilla v. Alexander, 440 F.Supp.
553, 555 (D. Or. 1977) (declaring construction of dam was inconsistent with treaty fishing right);
Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F.Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (enjoining construction of marina);
Nw. Sea Farms v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F.Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (affirming
Corps’ policy of denying in-water development permits where it would occupy treaty fishing
grounds)). For discussion of these cases, see also infra Part VI (describing many of these cases
in more detail); Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 462–81; SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1,
at 252–63; Lewis, supra note 31, at 298–99.
187
Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 174,
at 23.
188
See Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 24371166, at *3.
189
Id. Specifically, the tribes asked the court to declare: “(1) the right of taking fish
secured by the Treaties imposes a duty upon the State of Washington to refrain from diminishing
the number of fish passing through, or to or from, the Tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing
grounds by improperly constructing or maintaining culverts under State-owned roads and
highways; and that (2) the state has violated, and continues to violate, the duty owned the Tribes
under the Stevens Treaties.” Id.
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maintained by State agencies, that diminish the number of fish in the manner set forth above, and
(2) fix, within five years after judgment, and thereafter maintain all culverts built or maintained
by any State agency, so that they do not diminish the number of fish” available for the tribe to
make a moderate living.191
The state opposed the tribes’ motion for partial summary judgment by asserting the tribes
were not really concerned about culverts.192 Instead, the state maintained that the tribes sought
to establish an “environmental servitude,” which the Ninth Circuit rejected in its first review of
the Orrick Decision in 1982.193 The state also contended that the tribes could establish no factual
connection between reduced tribal harvest and culverts, pinning the blame for the tribes’ inability
to make a moderate living from fishing, “whatever that means,” on market prices and reductions
imposed by the Pacific Salmon Treaty.194 In the end, according to the state, what the tribes
wanted was veto authority over all state actions.195

190

Id.
Id.
192
Brief of State of Washington Opposing Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1,
United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 2–3, 5. On the Pacific Salmon Treaty, see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note
1, at 161–72.
In addition, Washington argued the case law did not support an implied right to habitat
protection. Brief of State of Washington, supra note 192, at 8–20. First, the state claimed that
the tribes misconstrued the “moderate living” language from Passenger Fishing Vessel, which
referred to an equitable remedy rather than a treaty right. Id. at 8–10. Second, the tribes ignored
or misunderstood applicable cases, including the real meaning of the reserved water rights
doctrine cases, which merely established a priority position for water in times of scarcity. Id. at
10–15. Finally, the tribes did not satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that they present a
concrete factual scenario to evaluate the implied habitat right because the tribes could not define
what a “moderate living” meant, meaning they “offer[ed] a legal rule completely untethered to
the facts.” Id. at 15–17.
195
Id. at 20. The state also filed a cross-motion asking for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the federal government for “placing a disproportionate burden of meeting the
191
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Judge Ricardo Martinez, who presided over the “Culverts Case,”196 came down squarely
on the side of the tribes and federal government. First, Judge Martinez evaluated the factual
evidence presented to him. Notwithstanding the state’s arguments that the tribes could produce
no evidence that culverts “affirmatively diminish the number of fish available for harvest,” the
court came to the “inescapable” conclusion that culvert blockages were “responsible for some
portion of the diminishment,” even if the tribes could not present an exact figure on the
“missing” fish.197 Thus, the court determined it had a purely legal matter to resolve: whether the
treaty fishing right required the state to avoid diminishment of the salmon runs through barrier
culverts.198
Washington insisted the Ninth Circuit had already answered the question in the negative
when it vacated the Orrick Decision, but Judge Martinez felt this was a mischaracterization of
the Ninth Circuit’s rulings.199 The judge noted that although the 1982 three-judge panel reversed
Judge Orrick on the environmental degradation question, it did not do so “as conclusively as the
State suggests.”200 Instead, the panel modified the habitat right from what it viewed as an
“environmental servitude” to a duty to take “reasonable steps” to protect habitat.201 Judge

treaty-based duty (if any) on the State” and alleging mismanagement of federal land that created
“a nuisance that unfairly burdened the State.” Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *1.
Judge Martinez dismissed the counterclaims based on the government’s argument that it had not
waived sovereign immunity. Id.
196
This article also refers to the case as the “Martinez Decision,” in keeping with other
significant dispositions under the United States v. Washington line of cases.
197
Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *3.
198
Id.
199
Id. at *3–4.
200
Id. at *4.
201
Id. (quoting the 1982 panel: “Let us repeat the essence of our interpretation of the
treaty. Although we reject the environmental servitude created by the district court, we do not
hold that the State of Washington and the Indians have no obligations to respect the other’s rights
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Martinez then noted that the en banc panel’s vacatur of both the 1982 panel’s opinion and the
Orrick Decision “did not contain [the] broad and conclusive language necessary to reject the idea
of a treaty-based [habitat] duty in theory as well as in practice.”202 In the end, according to Judge
Martinez, the Ninth Circuit merely held Judge Orrick did not have a sufficiently particular
factual basis before him to decide the issue; it did not reject the “concept of a treaty-based duty
to avoid specific actions which impair the salmon runs.”203 In fact, the appellate court seemed to
“presume” such a duty existed.204
Judge Martinez thought that the Culverts Case presented exactly the type of specific
factual situation the Ninth Circuit envisioned, and that the tribes had presented the sort of
evidence necessary to craft a narrow declaratory judgment.205 The court did not buy into the
state’s doomsday predictions of an “environmental servitude” in the narrow context of a dispute
over culverts.206

Neither did Judge Martinez accept Washington’s argument that the term

“moderate living” was ambiguous and unenforceable since the Supreme Court coined the

in the resource. Instead, we affirm the district court on the fish hatchery issue and we find on the
environmental issue that the State and the Tribes must each take reasonable steps commensurate
with the resources and abilities of each to preserve an enhance the fishery when their projects
threaten then-existing harvest levels.”).
202
Id.
203
Id. at *4–5 (citing en banc panel’s holding, as well as the various concurrences and
dissents).
204
Id. at *5 (“The court’s language, however, clearly presumes some obligation on the
part of the State; not a broad ‘general admonition’ as originally imposed by the district court, but
a duty which could be defined by concrete facts presented in a particular dispute. This dispute,
limited as it is to ‘only those culverts that block fish passage under State-owned roads,’ is
capable of resolution through the declaratory relief requested by the tribes.”).
205
Id. (referencing harvest data and numbers of blocked culverts presented by the tribes).
206
Id. (“A narrowly-crafted declaratory judgment such as the one requested here does not
raise the specter of a broad ‘environmental servitude’ so feared by the State.”).
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term,207 not the parties to the treaties.208 Therefore, the court could make use of well-established
rules of treaty construction in reaching a decision concerning the state’s treaty obligations with
respect to culverts.209
Employing a series of long block quotes from prior opinions in the line of United States
v. Washington proceedings, Judge Martinez determined the treaty right to take fish included a
right to habitat protection, which the state had violated through its construction and maintenance
of culverts that block fish passage.210 Judge Martinez emphasized that the treaty fishing right
was an essential element of the treaty bargain,211 reiterating that the treaty fishing right secured
not just an opportunity to fish, but the right to take fish.212 Both the tribes and the government
negotiators thought the fish runs were inexhaustible and would remain abundant forever, so they
did not think to include an express treaty provision protecting the resource from depletion.213
Since the tribes ceded vast expanses of land to the United States only on the condition that they
would retain their historic fishing rights, the negotiators’ “assurances would only be meaningful
if they carried the implied promise that neither the negotiators nor their successors would take
actions that would significantly degrade the resource.”214 Emphasizing that he was neither

207

See supra note 99–100 and accompanying text (describing “moderate living” phrase
introduced by the Supreme Court in Passenger Fishing Vessel).
208
Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *6 (“‘Moderate living’ is neither a ‘missing
term’ in the contract nor a meaningless provision; it is a measure created by the Court. To the
extent that it needs definition, it would be for the Court, not the Tribes, to define it. No party has
yet asked that the Court do so, and the Court finds it unnecessary at this time.”).
209
Id.
210
Id. at *10.
211
Id. at *7 (quoting Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 675–77 (1979)).
212
Id. at *7–8 (quoting Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678–80, and Declaration of
historian Richard White, Dkt. # 296, ¶¶ 8, 9, 11) .
213
Id. at *9–10.
214
Id. at *10 (quoting White Declaration, Dkt. # 298, ¶ 6).
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establishing a “broad ‘environmental servitude’ [n]or [imposing] an affirmative duty to take all
possible steps to protect fish runs,” Judge Martinez held, in light of the negotiators’ assurances,
that destructive practices like building culverts that blocked fish passage violated the treaty
fishing right.215 With that, on August 22, 2007, he adopted the tribes’ proposed language for the
declaratory judgment in its entirety.216 He set the trial date on the remedy for August 29,
2007,217 but the parties agreed to postpone the trial and negotiate to arrive at a remedy on their
own.218 A year later they conceded defeat.219

215

Id. (indicating his holding was a “narrow directive to refrain from impeding fish runs
in one specific manner” and stating the state’s duty to refrain from constructing barrier culverts
“arises directly from the right of taking fish that was assured to the Tribes in the Treaties, and is
necessary to fulfill the promises made to the Tribes regarding the extent of that right”).
216
Id. (“The Court hereby declares that the right of taking fish, secured to the Tribes in
the Stevens Treaties, imposes a duty upon the State to refrain from building or operating culverts
under State-maintained roads that hinder fish passage and thereby diminish the number of fish
that would otherwise be available for Tribal harvest. The Court further declares that the State of
Washington currently owns and operates culverts that violate this duty.”).
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., Billy Frank, Jr., supra note 132 (“Cooperation has long been the key to
natural resource management in Washington. We look forward to sitting down together with the
state to develop a comprehensive plan for fixing the culverts that can be put into action quickly.
The salmon can’t wait much longer.”); Lynda V. Mapes, Culverts: State, Tribes To Negotiate,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003859983_culvert30m.html (“[B]oth sides
have agreed to settle the case by spring, after the next legislative session, when lawmakers will
have to figure out a way to pay for culvert repairs.”).
219
Although the parties attempted to agree on a remedy for over a year, they remain
deadlocked. Email from Fronda Woods, supra note 24; Stipulated Amended Pretrial Scheduling
Order at 4, United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 70-9213)
(filed Dec. 1, 2008) (setting trial on the appropriate remedy for October 13, 2009). Although the
communications in the settlement discussions are confidential, the talks likely stalled on the
number of culverts to be fixed and the period of time allowed. Mapes, Culvert Ruling Backs
Tribes, supra note 163 (“The judge posed no remedy in the decision; that’s a step that will begin
next week. Fixing more culverts faster is sure to be on the table. And that is going to be
expensive. ‘I’m not going to use the ‘B’ word, but it’s millions of dollars,’ said Fronda Woods,
assistant attorney general for the state of Washington.”) (relating budgetary concerns of Paula
Hammond, interim transportation secretary for the WSDOT); Interview with Peter C. Monson,
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VI.

THE MARTINEZ DECISION’S ANTECEDENTS:
OTHER CONTEXTS

HABITAT PROTECTION IN

Although the exact contours of the habitat right remain undefined and continue to be the
subject of litigation,220 the Martinez Decision confirmed the implicit assumption relied upon in
several cases following the Orrick Decision: the notion that incorporated within the treaty right
of taking fish is a corollary right to habitat protection. In these cases, although the habitat
question was not squarely before the courts, they almost invariably enjoined specific habitatdamaging activities, relying on the treaty fishing right for authority.221 They are therefore the
logical antecedents of the Martinez Decision, helping to clarify that the decision is hardly an
outlier.
A prime example of a case adumbrating the Martinez Decision was the 1980 case of No
Oilport! v. Carter,222 in which tribes challenged construction of a proposed pipeline that would
have crossed Puget Sound and two rivers subject to treaty fishing rights.223 Judge Belloni ruled
the project satisfied the requirements of environmental statutes, but he determined sedimentation
from burying the pipeline under rivers covered by the treaties could adversely affect salmon
populations.224 Consequently, he ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether the pipeline would

supra note 174. Given the budgetary woes the state currently faces, it is possible that the state
simply cannot afford to fix culverts, even at the lethargic pace at which it has been pursuing
repairs. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. The state’s best hope might be to seek
reversal from the Ninth Circuit on appeal, thereby lightening its duties with respect to culverts.
220
Stipulated Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, supra note 219, at 4.
221
For a more complete discussion of cases providing tribes relief from habitatdamaging activities based on the treaty fishing right, see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note
1, at 252–71 (describing cases both preceding and following the Orrick Decision that affirmed
the habitat element of the treaty fishing right).
222
520 F.Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
223
Id. at 344.
224
Id. Note that Judge Belloni also presided over Sohappy v. Smith (or U.S. v. Oregon)
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cause the “fish habitat to be degraded such that the rearing or production potential of the fish will
be impaired or the size or quality of the run diminished.”225 If it did, the project could not go
forward as planned, although, as it turned out, the state of Washington’s concerns over potential
oil spills and fire prevented the project’s construction anyway.226
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit held the implied habitat component of the treaty fishing right
included water levels needed to sustain fish habitat. In Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside
Valley Irrigation District,227 the Yakama Indian Nation, which had been barred from exercising
its treaty fishing rights for some years due to low fish populations, challenged the Bureau of
Reclamation’s plan to reduce flows from the Cle Elum Dam in order to begin winter storage at
the end of the irrigation season.228 Recognizing that the reduced flows would threaten salmon
redds in the Yakima River with dewatering, the district court ordered measures be taken to
protect the nests of salmon eggs in accordance with the treaty fishing right.229 Despite three
successive opinions of the Ninth Circuit, the district court’s order requiring the Bureau to
undertake salmon habitat protection measures remained unscathed.230
Another case anticipating the Martinez Decision occurred in 1988, when the Muckleshoot
and Suquamish Tribes challenged a dredge and fill permit issued by the Army Corps of

proceedings. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
225
No Oilport!, 52 F.Supp. at 372–73.
226
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 257.
227
763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985).
228
Id. at 1033–34; see also Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 465.
229
Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 763 F.2d at 1034 (describing relief ordered by district court
Judge in unpublished opinion).
230
See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 466–67 (describing the three Ninth Circuit
opinions).
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Engineers that would have allowed development of a large-scale marina in Elliot Bay.231 The
permitted activity would have destroyed prime salmon fishing habitat, as well as a usual and
accustomed fishing area.232 In a well-reasoned decision, Judge Thomas Zilly referred to the
treaty fishing right as a “property right which may not be abrogated without specific and express
Congressional authority.”233 Judge Zilly recognized that the treaty fishing right contained two
discrete elements: 1) a right of access to particular geographic sites, and 2) a guarantee of a
sufficient harvest of fish to meet moderate living requirements.234 Because the proposed project
would preclude access to usual and accustomed treaty fishing places, the court enjoined the
marina permit even though the development would not necessarily affect the tribes’ moderate
living needs.235 In so doing, the court confirmed that the treaty access right could protect usual
and accustomed grounds from habitat destruction.236
Nearly a decade later, in 1996, the Army Corps of Engineers, apparently learning from its
prior experience, denied a permit for a fish farm operator to open a net pen fish farm in Puget
Sound based on the treaty fishing right.237 The agency determined the net pen would have
blocked access to a tribal fishing ground,238 and a district court upheld the decision, due to the

231

Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F.Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
Id. at 1505. See also id. at 1515 (“No case has been presented to this Court holding
that it is permissible to take a small portion of a tribal usual and accustomed fishing ground, as
opposed to a large portion, without an act of Congress, or to permit limitation of access to a tribal
fishing place for a purpose other than conservation.”).
233
Id. at 1512 (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381–82 (1905), and
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
234
Id. at 1514.
235
Id.
236
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 257. The tribes later reached a
settlement with the developer, which allowed construction of a reconfigured marina. Id.
237
Nw. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F.Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
238
Id. at 1518.
232
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federal government’s fiduciary obligation to account for the tribe’s treaty rights. The court
rejected the permit applicant’s suggestion that the court “conduct a balancing test which views
the right to access in relation to the supply of the proper portion of fish,” noting that the access
and moderate living aspects of the treaty right must be satisfied separately.239
In many respects, these cases anticipated the Culverts Case in that all of the judges
enjoined habitat-damaging projects based on the treaty fishing right, although the opinions did
not directly address the question of whether the treaty fishing right encompassed a right to
salmon habitat protection. The Culverts Case bridges that gap, employing the culvert as the
factual vehicle demanded by the Ninth Circuit.240
At the heart of each of these cases, including Judge Martinez’s recent opinion, is implicit
judicial recognition of the treaty-protected property right—that is, the piscary profit. As the
Supreme Court first articulated in 1905 in Winans, by reserving for themselves the “right of
taking fish,” the tribes created “a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein.”241 The tribes’ reservation of this profit was the linchpin of the Stevens treaties, which
facilitated the largest peaceful real estate transaction the country has known and allowed the
Pacific Northwest to avoid the full-scale Indian Wars that engulfed so much of the rest of the
country.242 In 1968, the Supreme Court reiterated that tribes’ reserved treaty rights constituted
“property rights” in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,243 a case involving Great

239

Id. at 1521–22.
See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
241
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See also notes 41–47 and
accompanying text (discussing U.S. v. Winans in more detail).
242
See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
243
391 U.S. 404 (1968).
240
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Lakes tribes’ reserved hunting and fishing rights.244

Moreover, the Court held that the

government would owe compensation under the Fifth Amendment for destruction of the property
rights retained by the tribes in a treaty.245 Thus, the Stevens treaties, as the supreme law of the
land, preclude significant habitat-destroying activities in the absence of explicit congressional
authorization and takings compensation.
Although Judge Martinez did not expressly discuss the “property rights” nature of the
treaty fishing right in the Culverts Case, his opinion illuminates one of the essential features of
the piscary profit—“a negative servitude (restriction) limiting activities that jeopardize the
supply of fish necessary to furnish the tribes a moderate living.”246 The habitat dimension of the
treaty fishing right is not without limit, however. At least one court has held the right does not
protect salmon and shellfish habitat from de minimis interference.247 In Lummi Indian Nation v.
Cunningham, Judge John C. Coughenour, in an unreported opinion, determined that disposal of
dredged spoil from the port of Bellingham’s shipping channel into Bellingham Harbor would
have a negligible effect on salmon migration.248 Since the dumping resulted in only a de minimis
interference with treaty rights, the court refused to enjoin the project.249 Judge Coughenour
concluded that “[t]he plaintiff is correct in asserting that ‘determination of the violation of a
treaty fishing right is not a balancing test.’ However, before the bright line test can be asserted,
the interference with the treaty right must reach a level of legal significance.”250 Consequently,

244

Id. at 413.
Id.
246
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 258.
247
Lummi Indian Nation v. Cunningham, No. C92-1023C (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 1992).
248
Id. at *4.
249
Id.
250
Id.
245
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interferences with treaty fishing rights must meet a “legal significance” threshold in order to be
actionable.
Confining the treaty right to afford protection from only those habitat-degrading activities
that satisfy a significance threshold makes sense in view of the purpose of the treaty fishing right
and background principles of property law. As the Supreme Court established in Passenger
Fishing Vessel, the Stevens treaties guarantee the tribes a right to make a moderate living
through fishing.251 Tribes can therefore make use of the habitat right only to the extent they can
link an habitat degrading activity to tribal members’ inability to make a moderate living.252
Using culverts as an example, tribes can restrain a state from constructing or maintaining fishblocking culverts that deprive them of the opportunity to achieve a moderate living, but they do
not have veto power over all culverts.253 Although the moderate living standard may “[lack] a
degree of precision,” it is well-established Supreme Court precedent and has been repeatedly

251

See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
Limiting enjoinable actions to those producing more than de minimis injuries is also
consistent with the federal government’s position. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
253
Compare Brief of United States, supra note 183, at 18 (“While tying the State’s
obligations to fix fish-blocking culverts to the moderate living standard may not be ideal, there is
before the Court no better standard. Therefore, the United States’ proposed formulation of the
State’s obligation ties it to the moderate living standard, yet it differs somewhat from that
presented by the Tribes. . . . [W]e propose[] limiting the culverts at issue to include only those
‘that appreciably degrade fish passage and interfere with the Tribes’ ability to realize a moderate
living from the fishery.’ This language is intended to be completely clear that any remedy in this
case should focus on those culverts that have more than a de minimis impact on the fishery.”),
with Brief of Plaintiff Tribes in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 174, at 23–25 (“The
equitable remedy should be shaped by appropriate equitable principles and by the facts presented
by this particular dispute. The culverts at issue here are those that block fish passage. Remedies
to address such blockages and the other habitat harm those culverts cause could include direction
on what methods and standards should be used to construct and maintain culverts to minimize
future unlawful take, the timing and prioritization of the repair of existing culverts, or the
appropriateness of off-site mitigation.”).
252

-53-

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223

invoked by lower courts.254 Moreover, the standard gives a judge considerable discretion in
fashioning a remedy in cases involving the habitat right, thereby assuaging erroneous concerns
that the habitat right is the equivalent of a “wilderness servitude” that would confer an unfair
windfall to tribes.255
First principles of property law similarly cabin the scope of the habitat right. As Winans
and Menominee Tribe made clear,256 the treaty fishing right is a protected property right, which
we have described as a piscary profit.257 The common law has long taught that holders of such
property rights can restrain others from unreasonably interfering with the exercise of a profit à
prendre.258 An “unreasonable interference” in the context of the Stevens treaties is habitat
degradation that prevents tribes from being able to make a moderate living from fishing through
decreased fish populations.259 Thus, only activities that restrict tribes’ ability to earn a moderate

254

Brief of United States, supra note 183, at 3, 16 n. 22.
See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 489–90 (describing cases in which courts’
decisions seem to reflect a “judicial unwillingness to express the scope of the treaty fishing right
in a manner that might require a restoration of conditions that existed at treaty time”); see
generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake
River Case, 36 Idaho L. Rev. 449 (1999) (analyzing the flawed logic of the opinion in Nez Perce
Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F.Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994)). See also City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 213–14 (noting equitable considerations figure into
the remedial stage of case involving Oneida Nation’s claim that parcels purchased in historic
homeland was free from state taxation).
256
See supra notes 41–47, 243–245 and accompanying text.
257
See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
258
See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (Q.B. 1707) (holding
owner of duck pond had cause of action against person who drove away ducks with gunfire
because “he that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable”; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing action by commercial fishers against oil companies
for damages resulting form an oil spill); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9
(2000) (“[T]he holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that
does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.”); id. § 1.12 (servitudes include
profits à prendre).
259
For a more detailed review of the probable scope of the habitat right, see Piscary
255
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living from fish unreasonably interfere with the tribes’ piscary profit.260

Courts have

considerable equitable discretion that should mollify anxieties that tribes may seek to establish
an “environmental servitude with open-ended and unforeseeable consequences,”261 since judges
may restrain only unreasonable interferences with the piscary profit in future particularized fact
scenarios.
Equitable considerations attendant to both the moderate living standard and the
unreasonable interference limit on profit enforcement foreclose the possibility of the feared
“environmental servitude.” At the same time, the standards provide at least some guidance
regarding the scope of the right for future cases seeking to enforce the habitat dimension of the
treaty fishing right. Case law relying on the moderate living standard in the context of regulating
non-tribal fishers is well-established,262 and principles found in those cases can guide courts and
litigants as to the scope of the right and appropriate remedies in the context of regulating nontribal “harvest” through habitat degradation.263

Profit, supra note 9, at 272–76.
260
A similar result would be achieved through the waste doctrine, which prohibits coowners from unreasonable actions. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir.
1975) (en banc) (“[The relationship between tribal and non-tribal fishers] is analogous to a
cotenancy. . . . Cotentants stand in a fiduciary relationship one to the other. Each has the right to
full enjoyment of the property, but must use it as a reasonable property owner. A cotenant is
liable for waste if he destroys the property or abuses it so as to permanently impair its value. A
court will enjoin the commission of waste. By analogy, neither the treaty Indians nor the state on
behalf of its citizens may permit the subject matter of the treaties to be destroyed.”).
261
See United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1983) (expressing
concerns at the scope of the treaty habitat right).
262
See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
263
One of us has previously set forth relevant lessons gleaned from the treaty fishing
rights cases that courts can apply in cases involving the habitat right. See SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 1, at 272–77. Lessons from the cases include that “[t]here is an obligation
to protect salmon habitat necessary to effectuate the treaty fishing right, but the treaties do not
demand a return to the environmental conditions that existed at the time the treaties were signed.
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VII.

THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES: THE FEDERAL ROLE AND THE APPROPRIATE
REMEDY
Notwithstanding the important step Judge Martinez took by enunciating the habitat right,

important questions remain unanswered. First, despite the fact that Judge Martinez issued his
opinion in mid-2007, the remedy remains unresolved. Second, the case opened the door to other
litigation opportunities for the tribes, including against the federal government, with whom the
tribes have worked closely throughout the United States v. Washington proceedings.

This

section explores these issues.
A.

Fashioning a Remedy in the Culverts Case
As previously mentioned,264 the tribes asked Judge Martinez for an injunction “requiring

Washington to identify and then to open culverts under state roads and highways that obstruct
fish passage, for fish runs returning to or passing through the usual and accustomed grounds and
stations of the plaintiff tribes.”265 However, despite a year’s worth of settlement discussions, the
parties were unable to agree on an appropriate remedy.266 Consequently, the question of which

The treaty obligations run not merely to the federal and state governments but . . . to private
parties as well. Private parties have no more authority than governments to exclude tribes from
their fishing grounds, to deprive them of their fair share of the salmon runs, or to destroy treatyprotected fish. However, private parties requiring government approval for their developments
may use the approval process to demonstrate compliance with treaty obligations.” Id. at 275. In
addition, state or federal activities may not participate in or license activities that unreasonably
interfere with exercise of the piscary profit. Id. at 275–76 (describing five requirements with
which governments can comply in order to avoid unreasonable interference with the tribes’
property right).
264
See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
265
Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *2 (citing Request for Determination, Dkt.
#1, at 1). Specifically, they asked that the inventory of problem culverts be completed within
eighteen months, and they wanted all barrier culverts to be fixed within five years. Id. at *3.
266
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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culverts need repair or replacement and when is again before Judge Martinez.267
Although the settlement discussions are confidential, the parties likely reached an
impasse due to the cost of dealing with barrier culverts at a more rapid pace.268 Washington has
exhibited a willingness to repair and replace culverts over the years, but it has proceeded at a
fairly slow speed.269 Since the state faces a significant budgetary shortfall, it appears either
unwilling or unable to accelerate that pace. At the time of the ruling, the state planned to devote
$69 million to fix state-owned culverts over twelve years.270 However, given the financial crisis
enveloping the state, whether even that low figure will materialize is hardly clear.271 The

267

Interview with Peter Monson, supra note 174.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also Mapes, Culverts Add Obstacles,
supra note 136 (suggesting that in addition to the “hundreds of millions of dollars” needed to fix
the culverts, another stumbling block might have been the tribes’ unwillingness to “create a
potential political liability in an election year for Gov. Christine Gregoire,” an ally on tribal
gaming and social service issues, in her tight race against Republican contender Dino Rossi).
269
See supra notes 150–157 and accompanying text. See also Robert McClure, Tribes
Win Ruling on Salmon, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 23, 2007, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/328681_salmon23.html (noting that state has opened up only
480 stream miles of habitat since 1991). But see Editorial Board, Salmon: State Doesn’t Get It,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 2007, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/329098_salmoned.html (suggesting that state has a long
history of “foot dragging,” writing Washington “just can’t seem to let go of its worn-out excuses
about its expenses and oh-so-strenuous efforts. When the case began in early 2001, the refrain
was the same, with then-Gov. Gary Locke and the attorney general, Gregoire, saying they were
‘disappointed’ that the tribes went to court”).
270
McClure, Tribes Win Ruling on Salmon, supra note 269. This figure was in addition
to the $26 million spent on fixing culverts since 1991, but far below the estimated “hundreds of
millions of dollars” needed to fix all of the state-owned barrier culverts. Mapes, Culverts Add
Obstacles, supra note 136.
271
Governor Christine Gregoire’s proposed 2008 budget called for just $15.3 million to
replace culverts impeding access to spawning grounds, which was an increase over the prior
figure, although well below the hundreds of millions required to fix the problem. See
Washington State Office of Financial Management, Gov. Gregoire’s Proposed 2008 Budget for
Capital Construction, http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget08/highlights/capital/proposal.htm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2008). However, the governor’s December 2008 budget for 2009–2011 made no
specific reference to the total funds set aside for culvert repair and replacement. See documents
268
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question remains whether Judge Martinez will proceed to establish barrier culvert priorities, a
budget, and a repair schedule for cash-strapped state agencies.
Judge Martinez must also determine how he wishes to craft the remedy. Courts have
great latitude in using their equitable powers to devise appropriate injunctive relief.272 Judge
Belloni understood the scope of this power when he retained continuing jurisdiction in Sohappy
v. Smith (now United States v. Oregon).273 Under his watchful eye, the current co-management
systems involving both state and tribal management of harvest levels for the Columbia River
came into being.274 Requiring a similar level of cooperation between the state of Washington

at Washington State Office of Financial Management, 2009–11 Budget Highlights,
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget09/highlights/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2008). A recent editorial in
the Seattle Times indicates Governor Gregoire has ordered state agencies to cut more than $590
million and proposes to cut an additional five to six billion dollars in the next budget cycle.
James N. Gregory, As Olympia Wrestles with a Budget Crisis, Can It Avoid the Mistakes of
1931?, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008474718_opin06gregory.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2009).
With regard to private landowner restoration work, the Washington Salmon Recovery
Funding Board awarded $19.8 million in grants to private landowners for habitat restoration,
including culvert replacement. Wash. Awards $19.8 Million to Protect Salmon, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Dec. 14, 2008, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/6420ap_wa_salmon_grants.html; see also Press Release,
Washington State Recreation & Conservation Office, Gov. Gregoire Announces More than $19.8
Million in Grants for Salmon Recovery, Dec. 12, 2008, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008474718_opin06gregory.htmlhttp://www.rco.
wa.gov/documents/Press_Releases/2008/gov_announces_millions_for_salmon_recovery.htm.
272
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the [court] to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”); Alaska
Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The district court has broad
latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to remedy an established wrong.”).
273
See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
274
See, e.g., Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 460–62 (describing developments in comanagement of salmon resources under the continuing jurisdiction under both Judges Belloni
and Boldt); Mary C. Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 16–17
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and the Puget Sound tribes might force the parties to come to an agreement on culvert
prioritization and timetables. Another solution would be to appoint a special master to oversee
the particulars of the culvert repair schedule and budget.275 Such approaches to establishing an
appropriate remedy in complex litigation have become commonplace.276
Should the state prove unwilling to participate meaningfully in a cooperative arrangement
under the court’s continuing jurisdiction or to adhere to the conclusions of a special master,
precedent exists for the court to take on the role of a judicial “fishmaster.”277 Under such a
system, the court would create a “consent decree structure whereby the states and tribes [would
develop] a judicially supervised and enforceable plan” for culvert repair.278 Indeed, in the

(2000) (describing Judge Belloni’s role in establishing the “innovative framework” for harvest
regulation in Pacific Northwest).
275
Such an approach was used in determining the Indians’ reserved water rights in
Arizona v. California. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979) (“[A]fter
determining that at the time of the treaties the resource involved was necessary to the Indians’
welfare, the Court typically ordered a trial judge or special master, in his discretion, to devise
some apportionment that assured that the Indians’ reasonable livelihood needs would be met.”)
(citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)). See also Alexis C. Fox, Comment,
Using Special Masters to Advance the Goals of Animal Protection Law, 15 ANIMAL L. 87, 92
(2008) (“A special master, sometimes called a master or referee, ‘is a private individual the court
appoints to assist it in performing functions in a pending action.’ . . . Unlike generalist judges
who preside over formal court proceedings, special masters act as expert decision makers or
judicial adjuncts who take a more active role in resolving specific issues in complex cases.”
(internal citations omitted)). The authority for use of a special master derives from Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 53. See id. (describing limits to use of special masters).
276
See generally Fox, supra note 272 (describing expansive use of special masters by
judges at present); Margaret F. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235 (1997) (describing rise of and critiquing legitimacy of special masters
in complex litigation); Mary C. Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary
Obligation in Governance 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 116 (2009) (advocating use of special masters in
adjudication of public trust violations).
277
See infra note 279 and sources cited therein.
278
See Wood, supra note 276, at 115 (describing systems put in place by Judges Belloni
and Boldt to deal with fish harvest allocations).
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context of treaty fishing rights in the United States v. Washington proceedings, Judge Boldt
eventually used this authority, although as a last resort.279 Shrewd judges would use this option
only when all else fails, given the criticism leveled at and resistance to orders issued by judges
who use the full scope of their authority.280 Still, taking on the role of “fishmaster” remains a

279

See Puget Sound Gillnetters v. U.S. District Court, Puget Sound Gillnetters v. U.S.
District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The state’s extraordinary machinations in
resisting [Judge Boldt’s] decree have forced the district court to take over a large share of the
management of the state’s fishery in order to enforce its decrees. Except for some desegregation
cases the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a
decree of a federal court witnessed in this century. The challenged orders in this appeal must be
reviewed by this court in the context of events forced by litigants who offered the court no
reasonable choice.”); see also United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (J.
Burns, concurring) (“I concur, but I want to add a brief comment from the viewpoint of a district
judge. As was suggested at oral argument, any decision by us to affirm also involves ratification
of the role of the district judge as a ‘perpetual fishmaster.’ Although I recognize that district
judges cannot escape their constitutional responsibilities, however unusual and continuing duties
imposed upon them, I deplore situations that make it necessary for us to become enduring
managers of the fisheries, forests, and highways, to say nothing of school districts, police
departments, and so on. The record in this case, and the history set forth in the Puyallup and
Antoine cases, among others, make it crystal clear that it has been recalcitrance of Washington
State officials (and their vocal non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced
the denial of Indian rights requiring intervention by the district court. This responsibility should
neither escape notice nor be forgotten.”).
In the context of Endangered Species Act litigation over the effects of the Columbia and
Snake River hydropower systems on Pacific salmon populations, Judge James Redden has used
his authority to institute a multisovereign consultation process. See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d 917, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding Judge Redden’s use of
90-day status reports and “failure report” requirement); see also Michael C. Blumm & Hallison
T. Putnam, Imposing Judicial Restraints on the ‘Art of Deception’: The Courts Cast a Skeptical
Eye on Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 55 (2008) (discussing
injunctive relief Judge Redden ordered). Judge Martinez has required 60-day status reports
throughout the negotiation process regarding the remedy in the Culverts Case, as well. Joint
Status Report at 1, United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. 709213) (dated Nov. 1, 2007).
280
See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (describing Judge Boldt’s oversight and
public reaction). Experiences like that of Judge Boldt have deterred some courts from using the
full extent of their equitable authority. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, v. Hodel, 624
F.Supp. 1045, 1062–63 (D. Nev. 1985) (“Boiled down and stripped of legalese this is a case in
which the plaintiffs ask me to become—and defendants urge me not to become—the
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viable option should the state and the tribes remain at loggerheads over remedial solutions.
B.

Broadening the Scope of the Treaty Right to Habitat Protection
When the tribes initiated the Culverts Case, the state of Washington immediately judged

the tribes’ intentions to be broader than seeking a judicial resolution of the culvert issue.281 If the
Martinez Decision withstands appellate review, the state is potentially liable for a wide variety of
habitat-damaging activities.282 Although Judge Martinez expressly cautioned that he was not
recognizing a “broad ‘environmental servitude,’” the tribes have established a winning strategy
for addressing state or state-permitted activities that degrade salmonid habitat, and, in turn,
impede their ability to make a moderate living.283 The strategy is simple: pick one of the myriad

rangemaster for about 700,000 acres of federal lands in western Nevada. For some reason, over
the past 15 years or so, I and many of my Article III colleagues have become or have been
implored to become forestmasters, roadmasters, schoolmasters, fishmasters, prisonmasters,
watermasters, and the like. This trend has not escaped the notice and criticism of academic
commentators. That criticism has been based upon observations which include lack of training
and expertise, lack of time, lack of staff assistance, and similar conditions. At bottom, however,
the primary reason for the large scale intrusion of the judiciary into the governance of society has
been an inability or unwillingness of the first two branches of our governments—both state and
federal—to fashion solutions for significant societal, environmental, and economic problems in
America.” (emphasis added) (internal footnotes and citations omitted)).
281
See supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text.
282
The state will almost certainly appeal the Martinez Decision once the remedy issue is
settled, given the potential scope of the habitat right and the finances involved. Interview with
Peter C. Monson, supra note 174.
283
Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). Nearly
three decades ago, the Orrick Decision identified certain environmental conditions that must be
satisfied in order to ensure the survival of salmonids: “(1) access to and from the sea, (2) an
adequate supply of good-quality water, (3) a sufficient amount of suitable gravel for spawning
and egg incubation, (4) an ample supply of food, and (5) sufficient shelter.” Orrick Decision,
506 F.Supp. 187, 203 (1980) (quoting the Joint Biology Statement between U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service and Washington Departments of Fisheries and Game). Judge Orrick proceeded to
describe a number of human-caused impacts that resulted in the destruction of salmon spawning
and rearing habitat, including “watershed alterations, water storage dams, industrial
developments, stream channel alterations, and residential developments.” Id. (quoting the Joint
Biology Statement). Specifically, he wrote quality habitat has been destroyed by the
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activities that degrade salmon habitat, connect the degradation to the depressed salmon
populations though factual evidence, cite the prior treaty cases and the canons of treaty
interpretation, and assert that diminished salmon numbers prohibit the tribal harvest from
providing tribal members a “moderate living.” For starters, the tribes could seek resolution of
the other destructive activities first presented to Judge Boldt some forty years ago.284
Beyond the broad implications of the state obligation to protect habitat, the Martinez
Decision raises the question of federal duties under the treaty habitat right.285 The Supreme
Court has never distinguished between the duties of the federal government, state governments,
or private landowners (i.e., federal grantees) under the Stevens treaties.286 Throughout the four
decade-long United States v. Washington proceedings, the federal government and the tribes

“urbanization and intensive settlement of the area, the rapid development of water power,
lumbering and irrigation and the pollution of the watersheds reduced the quality and amount of
accessible spawning grounds.” Id. (quoting the Joint Biology Statement). Each of these
destructive activities represents a potential avenue by which the tribes can attempt to broaden the
scope of the habitat right.
284
In Phase I, the tribes asserted logging, industrial pollution, and obstructions in fishbearing streams violated the implied habitat component of the treaty fishing right. Boldt
Decision, 384 F.Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Presumably, “obstructions” referred to
more than just culverts, potentially encompassing effects from dams. See also Lewis, supra note
31, at 284–86 (exploring opportunities for tribes to leverage the habitat protection right).
285
The tribes likely have other claims against local governments and private individuals.
See infra note 286 and accompanying text. In the geographic area covered by the Martinez
Decision, several local governments could be liable for barrier culverts. An Adopt-A-Stream
Foundation study indicated about 58% of culverts in eight watersheds in North King County and
Snohomish County blocked fish passage. Schwarzen, supra note 159. Most of the barrier
culverts assessed in the study were on private property and failed to meet current state standards.
Id.
286
See Piscary Profit, supra note 9, at 417, 442–43 (criticizing the initial Ninth Circuit
panel in Phase I because Winans established the obligations under the treaty fishing provision
ran to successors in interest); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381–82 (1905) (indicating
the treaty was enforceable both “against the United States and its grantees as well as against the
State and its grantees”).
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have been close allies,287 but judicial affirmation of the implied right to habitat protection may
very well create an incentive for the tribes to tackle some of the many federal activities that
inhibit salmon returns.
The most obvious federal habitat-destroying activity the tribes could pursue is the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service’s construction and maintenance of culverts
on federal lands in the Pacific Northwest. The federal government manages over 41 million
acres of land in Washington and Oregon, including 122,000 miles of roads that use culverts.288
A 2001 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that the Forest Service and BLM
inventoried at least 2,600 federally-owned barrier culverts, but estimated up to 5,500 actually
exist.289 The report concluded that the salmon habitat blocked by the culverts represented “some
of the best remaining habitat for salmon and other aquatic life, often serving as refuge areas for
the recovery of listed species.”290 The GAO identified budgetary constraints, other priorities,

287

Indeed, throughout the post-Stevens treaty era, the federal government and tribes have
teamed up against the states on multiple occasions, including in cases for which the tribes needed
the participation of the federal government to allow them to pursue claims against the state
themselves due to the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Nikel-Zueger, supra note 9, at 13 (“The
ensuing legal history was one between states, which attempted to deprive the Indians of the
rights established under the Stevens’ treaties, and the federal government, which tried to uphold
those rights.”); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp.
899 (D. Or. 1969); United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d sub
nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 669 (1979). Compare Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281–88 (1997) (holding
Eleventh Amendment barred the tribe’s suit for declaratory judgment that it owned the lakebed
of Lake Coeur d’Alene, and that Ex Parte Young exception did not apply where case directly
implicated state sovereignty), with Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (holding
executive order creating Coeur d’Alene Reservation reserved submerged lands of Lake Coeur
d’Alene to the tribe in case in which federal government sued state as trustee for the tribe).
288
GAO REPORT, supra note 133, at 1.
289
Id. at 2, 5. See also supra note 133 (noting that General Accounting Office changed its
name to the Government Accountability Office in 2004).
290
Id. at 4.
-63-

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356223

lengthy federal and state project approval processes, and short seasonal “windows of
opportunity” as factors delaying progress on the removal of fish passage barriers.291 However,
the Martinez Decision certainly suggests the implied habitat protection right under the treaties
would override these bureaucratic encumbrances.
As with the state duties, the federal duties likely go well beyond culverts. Virtually all
the known causes of salmon decline could be the target of a lawsuit under the treaty right to
habitat protection.292 For example, tribes could address the damage done by federally owned and
operated dams to salmonid habitat, which has been the subject of extensive Endangered Species
Act293 (ESA) litigation in the Pacific Northwest.294 Unlike those cases, the tribes would not need

291

Id. at 9.
See, e.g., Jane G. Steadman, Protecting Water Quality and Salmon in the Columbia
Basin: The Case for State Certification of Federal Dams, 38 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1332–35 (2008)
(describing negative effects of various human activities on salmon populations and detailing
hydropower’s effects in particular).
293
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
294
The tribes have been parties to much of this litigation. See generally Practiced at the
Art of Deception, supra note 25 (providing detailed account of ESA litigation over the
hydropower system in the Columbia and Snake basins). However, recent agreements between
the Bonneville Power Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation,
and several Columbia River treaty tribes, in what have come to be known as the “Columbia
Basin Accords,” will foreclose some tribal involvement in litigation over the federal Columbia
River hydropower system for at least ten years. William Yardley, Deal Gives Money to Tribes to
Drop Role in Fish Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/us/08dams.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). In exchange for
dropping out of the litigation, the Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakama, and Colville tribes and the
Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission will receive over $900 million, most of which will
be put toward habitat improvement and hatchery expansion. See Memorandum of Agreement
Among the Umatilla, Warm Springs and Yakama Tribes, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (April 4, 2008), available at
http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Biological_opinions/FCRPS/2008_biop/ColumbiaBasinFishAcc
ords.cfm. Notably absent from the accords is the Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, which reached an
impasse in negotiations with the federal agencies in August 2008. Press Release, Nez Perce
Tribal Executive Committee, Nez Perce Tribe Maintains Stance in Hydro Litigation (Aug. 20,
2008) (on file with author). The tribe remains a plaintiff in the 2008 BiOp litigation, alongside
292
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to limit their claims to effects on listed species, nor would they be limited to the narrow
“survival” and “recovery” constructs of the ESA.295 Instead, any activities that degrade the
habitat of any salmonid used by the tribes to pursue a “moderate living” would be fair game.296
With the Martinez Decision as support, the tribes could target virtually any federally-permitted
activities that degrade salmon habitat, including steep-slope logging, public lands grazing, and
floodplain development.297 Given the sorry state of salmonid habitat in the Pacific Northwest,
the litigation opportunities are legion.

several conservation groups, fishing groups, and the state of Oregon. Id.
295
The argument for removal of the Snake River dams, for example, would be much
improved by this broader habitat right. See Lewis, supra note 31, at 284; see also Michael C.
Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological,
Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lower John Day
Reservoir, and Restoring National River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1045 (1998). For discussion
of the “survival” and “recovery” aspects of the ESA, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2001) (defining “conservation” under the ESA as
including not just survival, but also recovery); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ESA was enacted not merely to
forestall the extinction of species, but to allow a species to recover to the point where it may be
delisted.”).
296
Engelson, supra note 132; NWIFC Press Release, supra note 143; Lewis, supra note
31, at 284.
297
Federal statutes like the Clean Water Act have proved ineffective with regard to
grazing-related water quality problems. See Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollution from
Livestock Grazing after ONDA v. Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30
Envtl. L. 617, 623–24 (2000). Tribes could use the treaty fishing right to address such habitat
degradation. Similarly, although conservation groups have used the ESA to address habitat
degradation resulting from rampant floodplain development, tribes could use the treaty fishing
right to prevent development that impedes their ability to make a moderate living from fishing
where unlisted runs exist. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 345
F.Supp.2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that implementation of National Flood Insurance
Program requires section 7 consultation under ESA). The same is true with respect to addressing
logging in riparian areas, which can introduce sediment to salmon-bearing streams. See, e.g.,
Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Assoc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 71 F.Supp.2d 1063
(W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 265 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (both upholding
and setting aside aspects of a NMFS Biological Opinion related to several federal timber sales on
national forest land).
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VIII.

CONCLUSION: THE COMMON SENSE OF THE MARTINEZ DECISION
The Martinez Decision represents the most significant step forward in the progression of

treaty fishing rights litigation since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Judge Boldt thirty years
ago. Over the years, at least twenty federal judges have found embedded within the treaty
fishing right a corollary right to protect salmon habitat from degradation that would preclude the
tribes’ ability to make a moderate living from fishing.298 Although the Culverts Case constitutes
the first time a judge has squarely addressed the question in the context of a particularized factual
scenario, Judge Martinez’s decision is consistent with dozens of cases stretching back to 1905,
when the Supreme Court first enunciated an expansive interpretation of the treaty fishing right
that reflected tribes’ understanding of a bargain in which they ceded most of their land in
exchange for reservation of the eternal right to fish.299 Moreover, as the Supreme Court in
Winans observed, the treaty fishing right is an important property right, which we have described
as a piscary profit.300

Judge Martinez’s decision is likewise consistent with common law

principles of profit and waste law, which preclude unreasonable interference with exercise of the

298

See supra notes 110–117, 118–130, 196–216, and 222–239, and accompanying text
(describing Judge Orrick’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s review of that opinion, Judge Martinez’s
opinion, and series of cases in which courts prohibited specific activities that would degrade
salmon habitat based on the potential effects on tribes’ ability to exercise their treaty fishing
rights). Only one federal magistrate, whose opinion was adopted by the federal district court, has
ever concluded the treaty fishing right did not require that habitat-degrading activity be enjoined.
See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F.Supp.791 (D. Idaho 1994). For a critique of this
opinion and an explanation of the reasons why the opinion is inconsistent with prior treaty
fishing opinions, see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 1, at 267–71.
299
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see also supra Parts I, II, III, V, VI
(describing history of treaty fishing rights litigation in Pacific Northwest, including explanation
of treatment of habitat degradation).
300
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. See also supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text
(describing property rights nature of treaty fishing right); SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note
1, at 270–72, 276 (describing nature of piscary profit and the “no unreasonable interference”
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profit.301

The treaty fishing right prevents the state of Washington from constructing and

maintaining culverts that block fish passage, so as to unreasonably interfere with tribes’ ability to
earn a moderate living from fishing.302 The effect of the Martinez Decision will be to rectify the
fundamental unfairness in treaty fishing rights law, which allocates harvest shares, includes both
hatchery and wild fish, and yet allows destruction of the resource, which was the central
consideration of one of the largest real estate transactions in history.
Through the Culverts Case, the Puget Sound tribes have charted a path for all tribes with
reserved fishing rights under the Stevens treaties to force meaningful salmon restoration efforts
from the state and federal governments alike and even private parties, efforts that will redound to
the benefit of non-Indian salmon fishers, as well. The tribes have exercised remarkable restraint
over the past few decades, exploring negotiation and co-management strategies rather than
litigation.303 They have evidenced a willingness to accept budgetary practicalities, and do not
seem intent to “turn back the clock” to the relatively pristine habitat existing at the time of the
treaties’ signing.304 After Judge Martinez issued his opinion, Billy Frank, Jr., longtime chairman
of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, said:
In order for us all to live together, we are not turning the lights off. But we have
to do a better job at what we are doing. We have to have the leadership and the
guts to make it happen, and we haven’t had the political will for salmon in this
state. . . . We need the political will to bring the salmon back and have a home
when they get here.305
With Judge Martinez’s decision, perhaps the tribes can leverage more of the political will the

standard).
301

See supra notes 258–260 and accompanying text.
Martinez Decision, 2007 WL 2437166, at *6, 10 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
303
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
304
Mapes, Culvert Ruling Backs Tribes, supra note 163 (quoting Billy Frank, Jr.).
302
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region needs to restore the salmon and fulfill the treaty obligations committed to so long ago.

305

Id.
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